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ABSTRACT
The digital information environment functions today as the backbone of democracies. This
environment is operated by online intermediaries that control the flow of information and
monitor content running through their “pipelines.” Thus far, content monitoring has been
conducted with almost no regulation and according to the intermediaries’ own (commercial)
policies. In that respect, online intermediaries have become, in fact, the online rulers. Therefore,
the issue of online content monitoring stands at the heart of contemporary social and legal
discourse, since it challenges other public, individual, or commercial entities’ constitutional rights
and freedoms, such as freedom of speech, or more broadly, other “digital human rights.”
Online rulers are facing a new legal and social challenge, since they are the ones expected to strike
the appropriate constitutional balance, although they are private-commercial entities. This reality
can be demonstrated through different practices concerning content monitoring in cases of
alleged copyright infringement, such as the legal schemes of “notice and takedown” or “blocking
orders.” Online rulers are expected to act as gatekeepers for the sake of public interest—but
without any legal infrastructure.
Against this backdrop, the article aims to explore whether and how some of the basic public law
standards, such as accountability, transparency, equality, and reasoning, could be imposed on
relevant online rulers. European countries, in contrast to the U.S., are more willing to accept the
introduction of public law standards into the private law sphere. According to an accepted
doctrine, in some cases private entities may be perceived as a hybrid private/public body, and as
a result the door opens for the direct imposition of some public law standards on such private
entities. This article proposes that in relevant cases major online rulers should be acknowledged
as hybrid bodies, in order to promote a balanced and fair digital information environment. There
are many advantages in using this doctrine, which allows a gradual and dynamic application of
public law principles, and on a global scale. The challenge for such potential legal move in the
U.S. is greater, considering the current interpretation of the “state action doctrine,” which hinders
the application of constitutional rights in the private sphere. Nevertheless, this current judicial
restrictive approach could be relaxed by further future judicial elaborations. The significance of
this article, therefore, lies in its potential to assist in shaping better policies and practices in the
future that can and should be initiated by the U.S. judiciary.
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INTRODUCTION
Today the state is not the sole source of sovereignty, since its rule is shared
not just with supra-state authorities but also with powerful private entities.1
This is particularly evident in the current digital environment, which is
operated and governed by a few super-corporations, such as the Big Five
technology firms.2 This article explores the questions of whether some public
law norms, which bind the state, should be imposed on these private entities
governing the digital sphere, and moreover, how such legal moves can be
achieved.
The digital sphere is operated by a pyramid of “in-between” actors, known
as Internet or online intermediaries. These intermediaries include the
physical network access providers (ISPs) and various online services providers,
such as search engines, content platforms, and social media networks.3 The
structure of the digital environment has changed the way information is
produced, used, and disseminated: All layers are involved with the traffic of
information, whereas the platforms at the upper layer are also engaged in
curation of the content.4 Therefore, while the various online intermediaries
may be different in regard to the degree of their involvement in the
dissemination and curation of information (i.e. some would be regarded more
passive and others more active), all intermediaries nevertheless play a
1

2

3
4

DAN JERKER B. SVANTESSON, INTERNET & JURISDICTION GLOBAL STATUS REPORT 2019,
INTERNET & JURISDICTION POL’Y NETWORK (2019), at 49, available at
https://www.internetjurisdiction.net/uploads/pdfs/GSR2019/Internet-Jurisdiction-Global-StatusReport-2019_web.pdf (citing E. Weitzenboeck, Hybrid Net: The Regulatory Framework of ICANN
and the DNS, 22 INT’L J. L. INFO. TECH. 49, 68 (2014) (“[T]he state ceases to be the sole source of
sovereignty. . . .”).
The Big Five multinational technology companies in terms of market capital
are Apple, Amazon, Alphabet (holding company for Google), Microsoft, and Facebook. Katie
Jones, The Big Five: Largest Acquisitions by Tech Company, VISUAL CAPITALIST (Oct. 11, 2019),
https://www.visualcapitalist.com/the-big-five-largest-acquisitions-by-tech-company/. See also Rory
Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L.J. 1267, 1269 (2017) (arguing that digital
intermediaries, in the context of commercial markets, regulate “by influencing behavior in ways
similar to public actors”); How 5 Tech Giants Have Become More Like
Governments Than Companies, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2
017/10/26/560136311/how-5-tech-giants-have-become-more-like-governments-thancompanies?t=1558819996409 (reflecting “New York Times tech columnist Farhad Manjoo
warn[ing] that the ‘frightful five’—Amazon, Google, Apple, Microsoft and Facebook—are collectively
more powerful than many governments”).
See STEFAN KULK, INTERNET INTERMEDIARIES AND COPYRIGHT LAW: EU AND US
PERSPECTIVES, 10–11 (2019) (discussing “in-between” actors).
See id. at 17–21 (discussing the history of the internet and copyright law).
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significant role in the operation of the current digital environment. The
intermediaries are involved in the flow of information at all layers of the digital
sphere’s pyramid, and thus they function as the “valves” that control the traffic
of content in their respective “pipelines.” In that respect, these online
intermediaries are in fact online rulers.
In the 1990s, digital technological and social development was celebrated
as a facilitator for a utopian democracy.5 Two decades later, the fear in
democratic states of the ill-consequences of centralized control of online rulers
over the digital sphere has taken over.6 Online rulers, being commercial
entities, are free to monitor the information flow in their pipelines; they are
free to remove content as they deem fit; they may block access to content or
sites at their own will. Thus far, legal attempts to claim that these online rulers
are subject to some “must-carry” obligations, i.e. they cannot remove content
or block access at their own will, considering their major role in the digital
speech environment, has failed.7 Moreover, since the digital speech
environment has replaced the press and other traditional media as well as
traditional fora such as parks, market squares, and shopping malls, the basic
questions of freedom of speech are still valid: Should we as a society tolerate
any digital speech? Should the digital dissemination of harmful content be
banned and in what manner? Should uninvolved third parties be held liable
for not banning the flow of illegal digital speech and infringing content or, by
the same token, be held liable for banning such flow? Clearly, one of the most
urgent legal challenges that democratic states currently face is designing the
appropriate legal governance that should be applied to online rulers.8

5

6

7
8

See Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Global Platform Governance: Private Power in the Shadow of the State,
72 SMU L. REV. 27, 33–38 (2019) (reviewing the early utopian trend in scholarly writing regarding
the internet).
See DAPHNE KELLER, HOOVER INST., WHO DO YOU SUE? STATE AND PLATFORM HYBRID
POWER OVER ONLINE SPEECH (Aegis Series Paper No. 1902) (2019) (detailing the broad discretion
of online platforms and their ability to remove speech from their platforms).
Id. at 11–13.
Online platforms’ liability for hate speech or encouragement of violence stood at the heart of a
massive public debate in May–June 2020, when Twitter labeled President Trump’s online messages
as potentially ‘false’ or as ‘glorifying violence.’ President Trump perceived this move as an ‘editorial
decision,’ which hinders freedom of speech. Maggie Haberman & Kate Conger, Trump Signs
Executive Order on Social Media, Claiming to Protect ‘Free Speech’, N.Y. TIMES (last updated June
2,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/28/us/politics/trump-order-social-media.html.
Following these events, in June 2020, massive public pressure was put on Facebook to follow
Twitter’s move and to adopt a new proactive policy monitoring speech which encourages violence.
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This article argues that since all online rulers serve as potential gatekeepers
for access and participation in the global digital fora, a set of public law norms,
such as quasi-administrative legal obligations, should be imposed on them in
order to guarantee the protection of Digital Human Rights. In order to explain
this stance, first the notion of Digital Human Rights will be presented. This
discussion serves as the basis for the proposition that public law norms should
be stretched into the private sphere, as it describes both the acknowledgment
of these new (or nuanced) human rights and the risk to their fulfillment caused
by content monitoring practices conducted by major online rulers. There are
different content monitoring practices in the U.S. and Europe; however, both
present a challenge to Digital Human Rights. Then, the article will turn to
discuss the major legal obstacle to such a move, at least in the U.S., which
stems from the fact that online rulers are private corporations. While
European legal tradition is more sympathetic to the introduction of human
rights standards into the private sector by horizontal application, the American
counterpart is generally hostile to such legal moves. Therefore, the imposition
of human rights standards on private entities should overcome the legal
obstacle of the private/public law divide. For this aim, the doctrine of “hybrid
private/public bodies” will be presented. According to this accepted doctrine,
in some cases private entities, such as commercial companies that serve a
social function in nature, may be perceived as hybrid private/public bodies.9
The legal consequence stemming from such perception is that the door opens
for the direct imposition of public law standards on the relevant private entity.
We will propose that in relevant cases major online rulers should be
acknowledged as hybrid bodies, in order to promote a balanced and fair digital
information environment.
The advantage of applying the hybrid bodies doctrine to online rulers lies
exactly in its dynamic nature. The acknowledgment of an online ruler as a
hybrid body is only the starting point for the substantial discussion as to which
quasi-administrative principles should be applied and to what extent. It
Rachel Lerman & Craig Timberg, Bowing to Pressure, Facebook Will Start Labeling Violating Posts

9

from
Politicians.
But
Critics
Say
It’s
Not
Enough, WASH. POST (June 27, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/06/26/fa
cebook-hate-speech-policies. These events, and the public outcry, demonstrate the importance of
imposing the appropriate legal governance on online rulers.
See, e.g., Human Rights Act 1998, c.42 § 6(1) (UK); Aharon Barak, Constitutional Human Rights
and Private Law, 3 REV. CONST. STUD. 218, (1996).
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certainly does not imply a “must-carry” obligation but rather a set of norms
that should govern the process of decision making, such as: transparency,
giving reason, equality, and any kind of judicial review. These major factors
would make the online ruler accountable to its operation, on a procedural
level. The creation of legal governance over the decision-making process of
online rulers may generate the needed guarantees for adequate protection of
Digital Human Rights and at the same time preserve the online rulers’
adequate freedoms in conducting their own business,10 thus preserving some
core net-neutrality.11 The development of governance principles for online
rulers should be made cautiously, since it should balance complex interests
and accommodate rapidly changing technologies and social reality. The
hybrid bodies doctrine allows such gradual development, since it does not rule
on the outcome (remove/don’t remove content) but only moves, in part, the
procedural parts of the operation of the digital environment into the public
law sphere.
The potential role of the hybrid bodies doctrine will be demonstrated with
respect to the issue of allegedly copyright infringing content that the various
Internet operators are requested to remove or block. While such a request
may be justified by the copyright holders’ wish to prevent economic injury,
when such removal or block eventually takes down legal content it harms users
— and in fact the public at large. In other words, content monitoring may
injure the public’s Digital Human Rights. Therefore, in order to properly
protect both sides’ legitimate interests, a quasi-administrative legal framework
may ease the tension, where the online ruler cannot be an indifferent
intermediary, and where it should operate in accordance to some basic public
law principles that would ensure that there are no biased, capricious, or
unreasonable decisions made.

10

11

See Eugene Volokh & Donald M. Falk, Google First Amendment Protection for Search Engine
Search Results, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 883, 886 (2012) (reflecting that, in the U.S., the online
platforms should enjoy basic freedoms as well, such as freedom of speech). Similarly, the European
Court of Justice (EUCJ) has acknowledged a basic right to conduct a business freely. Case C-70/10
Scarlet Extended SA v. Société Belge des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Éditeurs SCRL (SABAM), 2011
(Scarlet Extended case); Case C-360/10 Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en
Uitgevers (SABAM) v. Netlog NV, 2012 (the SABAM cases).
For a critical description of the net-neutrality approach, see Kristen E. Eichensehr, Digital
Switzerlands, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 665 (2019) (describing the U.S. technology companies as “digital
Switzerlands” because they are not completely regulated by their host nation and are “neutral”).
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This article will proceed as follows: Part II will shortly describe the
centrality of online rulers in current society and explore the notion of Digital
Human Rights. Part III will delve into the issue of content monitoring, by
describing current practices in the U.S. and in Europe, explaining the
problems stemming from such practices to Digital Human Rights, and
identifying the legal divide between the public and private spheres as a barrier
to the adoption of a legal mechanism that may ease the conflict created by
content monitoring. Part IV will focus on the public/private divide by
describing the American state action doctrine, which preserves a dichotomic
perception, and by describing other contemporary approaches that claim that
the divide is blurred, and public law norms have long percolated into the
private sphere. Then, the doctrine of hybrid bodies, which allows the
imposition of public law obligation on private entities, will be presented. Part
V ties up both ends: It presents the stance that major online rulers should be
perceived in relevant cases as hybrid bodies, and it demonstrates this view with
respect to allegedly copyright infringing content monitoring mechanisms.
I. ONLINE RULERS AND DIGITAL HUMAN RIGHTS

A. The Role of Online Rulers in the Digital Age
The digital environment has generated what is known in scholarly writing
as the age of “information society.”12 The dissemination of information,
thereby of knowledge and ideas, through digital technologies has created a
major societal leap and a paradigm shift, in Kuhnian terms.13 The emergence
of the Internet and its early days were accompanied by a utopian sentiment
concerning a free and purely democratic sphere that would allow for
uncontrolled speech and social engagement.14 In recent years, however, there
has been a growing understanding that the digital environment faces crucial

12

13

14

See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS
MARKETS AND FREEDOM 1–6, 27 (2006) (detailing the changes in technology, economy, and
society).
THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970); see also
BENKLER, supra note 13 (reflecting further on the societal changes brought on by digital
technologies).
Bloch-Wehba, supra note 5, at 27, 33–38.
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obstacles that prevent the accomplishment of such ideals.15 The obstacles vary
with respect to various online actors in the different layers of the digital
sphere’s pyramid; however, there is one basic shared problem stemming from
the fact that all online rulers are privately owned commercial corporations.
If we inspect the uppermost layer of the digital sphere’s pyramid,
containing online platforms, speech in this digital layer has indeed “created a
global democratic culture.”16 Various social media platforms, such as
Facebook, YouTube, and WhatsApp, are examples of major online
platforms. These major online platforms function as the current market
square, yet on a global scale.17 Online platforms provide essential public
needs, such as the “place” in which individuals may access information,
express themselves, and thereby enjoy access to and engage with the social and
cultural life of their communities.18 Yet, although the services online platforms
provide became a backbone of the public civil experience, they are
nevertheless operated by privately owned commercial corporations.
Moreover, the market of online platforms is currently centralized, held by a
few mega corporations that are highly dominant in the relevant market
segment.19 Thereby, the global democratic market square is run by a few
private holders.20

15

16

17

18

19

20

See Bloch-Wehba, supra note 5, at 35 )describing the various realistic responses to the early utopian
approach); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View from Liberal
Democratic Theory, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 395, 403 (2000) (arguing that regulating the cybersphere
will become inevitable in order to maintain basic liberal democratic norms).
Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech ,
131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1664 (2018); see also Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic
Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 34–
35 (2004) (stressing the important role of digital speech for the participation of people in a democratic
culture).
See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017) (citation omitted) (reflecting that
these platforms “allow a person with an Internet connection to ‘become a town crier with a voice that
resonates farther than it could from any soapbox’”). This case is further discussed below in Part II.B.
See Evelyn Mary Aswad, The Future of Freedom of Expression Online, 17 DUKE L. & TECH. REV.
26, 31 (2018) (detailing the view of the United States Supreme Court that social media and cyberspace
is “one of the most important places to exchange views”).
See Katie Jones, The Big Five: Largest Acquisitions by Tech Company, VISUAL CAPITALIST (Oct.
11,
2019),
https://www.visualcapitalist.com/the-big-five-largest-acquisitions-by-tech-company/
(outlining the dominance of the Big Five tech companies, Microsoft, Apple, Amazon, Alphabet
(Google), and Facebook).
See Aswad, supra note 18, at 30 (suggesting that this reality may fit the coined notion of a “neomedieval” social structure, in which non-state actors, such as feudal owner of properties, govern).
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If we inspect the lower layer of the digital sphere’s pyramid, we may reach
similar conclusions. The access to the digital sphere is operated by digital
infrastructure bodies, i.e. the ISPs, a term which refers to a wide range of
access facilitators.21 These bodies function as the “pipelines” of the democratic
digital environment, and as such they also operate its “valves.” Therefore, in
fact, ISPs control both the flow of information and the access to the
information environment. Yet, ISPs are private corporations as well, therefore
the “pipelines” of democracy are run by the private sector.
One may say that this is not a new phenomenon, since in the pre-digital
era the press and traditional broadcasting media could have been described as
the backbone of democracy as well, and most of these vehicles are also
privately owned.22 Thus, to a certain extent, it could be argued that the issue
of the role of online platforms and ISPs is nothing more than “old wine in new
bottles.” However, the old speech vehicles were mainly local, with much less
exposure and thereby dominancy in comparison to current online platforms.23
The online platforms have created not only a global, supra-state, democratic
fora, but in some communities their services are assimilated to the “Internet”
itself.24 Indeed, it is a matter of degree. In other words, online platforms’
global reach and dominancy presents a new legal challenge. The extreme size
and power of some online platforms should play a major role in designing new
21

22

23

24

The ISPs’ function includes the basic physical network providers (such as cable companies) and
Internet access providers, which may be carried by cable companies or mobile companies. See Kulk,
supra note 3, at 10–11 (discussing internet intermediaries).
For the press and media power and ownership in the pre-digital era, see Daniel L. Brenner,
Ownership and Content Regulation in Merging and Emerging Media, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 1009
(1996) (describing the private ownership of various press and media in the U.S. and discussing the
negative and positive consequences stemming from mergers that would create mega media
corporations); C. Edwin Baker, Media Concentration: Giving up on Democracy, 54 FLA. L. REV.
839, 902–19 (2002) (describing the private and concentrated ownership of major media in the U.S.
and the potential harm to free speech); L. P. Hitchens, Media Ownership and Control: A European
Approach, 57 MOD. L. REV. 585 (1994) (describing the British and European private ownership
structure of mass media).
Brenner, supra note 22, at 1011 (“The old electronic marketplace of fifteen years ago, dominated by
the three television networks and their affiliated stations, is a substantial but not dominant portion of
the electronic landscape. Programmers and distributors view the market as worldwide, not
domestic.”).
See Leo Mirani, Millions of Facebook Users Have No Idea They’re Using the Internet, QUARTZ
(Feb. 9, 2015), https://qz.com/333313/milliions-of-facebook-users-have-no-idea-theyre-using-theinternet/. According to this non-academic research, a very high percentage of people, especially in
developing countries, such as Nigeria and Indonesia, use Facebook and believe that Facebook is the
Internet. One of the proposed reasons for such reality is that in some of these countries Facebook
is the major or even only free and accessible platform.
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legal measures aimed at accommodating the new legal challenges.
Furthermore, the online platforms enjoy new characteristics stemming from
the technology, such as the unlimited capacity of curation of information,
which generates new legal challenges. Moreover, the ISP’s role cannot be
compared with that of the traditional media, since their control is over the
communication infrastructures. Therefore, ISPs should be resembled to the
role of broadcasting signals, which are usually regulated by the state.25
In many cases, some basic needs are covered by the private sector;
however, the fact that the private sector is not only the sole operator of the
democratic digital environment but is also controlled by a handful of major,
dominant corporations leads to a conflict with protected human rights.

B. Digital Human Rights
Freedom of speech, that is protected under the U.S. Constitution’s First
Amendment,26 includes both active acts of expression and access to
information, which are acknowledged as protected human rights.27 On an
International Law level, freedom of speech is proclaimed and guaranteed both
under the Universal Declaration of Human rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, safeguarding “the right to hold opinions
without interference” and “the right to seek, receive, and impart information
and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers” and through any medium.28
Access to cultural life is an acknowledged human right as well. Article 27
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that “everyone has
25

26
27

28

The Federal Communications Commission regulates communications by radio, television, wire,
satellite, and cable in the U.S. What We Do, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/aboutfcc/what-we-do (last visited Oct. 20, 2020); see also 47 C.F.R. §§ 1–1513 (2020) (setting forth the
statutory regulations in the United States).
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See FREDERICH SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 15-86 (1982) (explaining
the multi-facet aspects of free speech); see also Roy Peled & Yoram Rabin, The Constitutional Right
to Information, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 357, 360 (2011) ("[T]he right to information is a
precondition for the exercise of procedural political rights, such as the freedom of expression.").
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 19, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Everyone
has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions
without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and
regardless of frontiers.”); G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) art. 19(2), International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (Mar. 29, 1967) (“Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right
shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of
frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his
choice.”).
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the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community.”29 This
human right was further anchored in Article 15(1) of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, which states that “the
States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone: (a) To
take part in cultural life.”30 The U.S. is not a party to the Covenant; however,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights may represent customary
international law norms,31 or at least a source of inspiration for accepted moral
standards.32 Various international law instruments assist in clarifying the
content and boundaries of this cultural human right.33 A comprehensive
clarification can be found in a U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization recommendation from 1986, according to which the right
embraces two key elements: 1. Access to Culture, defined as “the concrete
opportunities available to everyone, in particular through the creation of the
appropriate socio-economic conditions, for freely obtaining information,
training, knowledge, and understanding, and for enjoying cultural values and
cultural property”; 2. Participation in Cultural Life, defined as “the concrete
opportunities guaranteed for all—groups or individuals—to express themselves
freely, to act, and engage in creative activities with a view to the full
development of their personalities, a harmonious life, and the cultural
progress of society.”34 Clearly, the right to participate in cultural life is a
nuanced subset of freedom of speech, encompassing both passive and active
perspectives;35 however, it focuses on the democratic cultural sphere. This

29 G.A. Res. 217, supra note 28, at 71 (Dec. 10, 1948)
G.A. Res. 2200, supra note 28, at 45, (Dec. 16, 1966).
30
31 See PAUL SEIGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 14–19 (1983) (discussing the
history and structure of modern international human rights laws); see also Hurst Hannum, The Status
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 287, 298, 301, 304–07, 322–24 (1995) (positing that the Universal Declaration has become
part of customary international law).
32 See HENRY J. STEINER, PHILIP ALSTON, & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS, TEXT AND MATERIALS 138–39 (3d ed. 2000) (describing how
the Universal Declaration is perceived as the prime document and constitution of the human rights
movement, with a symbolic and ideological status).
See Orit Fischman-Afori, Human Rights and Copyright: The Introduction of Natural Law
33
Considerations into American Copyright Law, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 497
(2004) (analyzing these legal instruments).
UNESCO, Rep. of Programme Commiss’n II, annex, Recommendation on Participation by the
34
People at Large in Cultural Life and Their Contribution to It, 19th Sess., I.2, 31 (Nov. 26, 1976).
35 Fischman-Afori, supra note 33, at 514.
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right is highly relevant in the current digital environment.36 Particular attention
has been given recently to the right to participate in cultural life in its current
phase, the right to participate in digital cultural life and digital discourse, which
in other words has evolved into Digital Human Rights. Digital Human Rights,
therefore, include digital freedom of speech and its sub-branch of digital
cultural rights. It should be noted that Digital Human Rights concern
additional aspects, such as privacy; however, these fall outside the scope of this
article.
In a gradual process, the U.N. has stressed the importance of this new
phase of Digital Human Rights. Already in 1993, the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights established the mandate of the Special
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of
opinion and expression. The mandate was extended periodically, and special
reports were submitted along the years.37 One of its significant milestones, the
Special Rapporteur report on the promotion and protection of the right to
freedom of opinion and expression, submitted in 2011, has declared that
Internet access, in general, should be perceived as a human right and as part
of the freedom of speech.38
The report included many concrete
recommendations aimed to secure access to the Internet for all, which will be
further explored in this article.39 Thereafter, following reports elaborated
various aspects of Digital Human Rights, including another significant report
submitted in 2018 that focused on online content regulation.40 Moreover, in
2016, the United Nations Human Rights Council released a nonbinding
resolution condemning disruption of Internet access by governments, which

36

See Lea Shaver & Caterina Sganga, The Right to Take Part in Cultural Life: On Copyright and
Human Rights, 27 WISC. INT’L. L.J. 637, 638 (2009) (proposing to frame the movements for further
freedom of speech on the Internet in terms of human rights); see also Kitsuron Sangsuvan, Balancing
Freedom of Speech on the Internet Under International Law, 39 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 701,
703, 706 (2014) (discussing the importance of freedom of speech on the internet).

37

38

39
40

Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Freedom of Opinion and Expression,
OHCHR, https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/freedomopinion/pages/opinionindex.aspx (last visited
Oct. 9, 2020).
Frank La Rue (Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of
Opinion and Expression) Special Rep., ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/27, (May 16, 2011) (“[T]he
Internet has become a key means by which individuals can exercise their right to freedom of opinion
and expression.”).
Id. See also infra part II.C.
Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion
and Expression, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/38/35 (July 6, 2018).
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further anchored the right to Internet access as a basic human right.41
Following this path, in January 2020 the Indian Supreme Court ruled that the
long Internet access ban in Jammu and Kashmir, which had been presented
by the government as a needed measure to fight terror, violated the Indian
constitutional right to freedom of speech and expression.42
In the U.S., similar evolvement took place when the importance of Digital
(Human) Rights was stressed in a gradual process.43 A highlight of this process
was when, in 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court, in its decision in the case of
Packingham v. North Carolina, acknowledged access to online social media
(such as Facebook) as part of the right to freedom of speech.44 Therefore, the
Court struck down state legislation that prevented convicted criminals from
accessing social media, as it violated constitutional First Amendments rights.45
This seminal decision placed the issue of regulating online platforms at the
heart of the Digital Human Rights discourse. In other words, one of the major
arenas in which the doctrine of Digital Human Rights should operate is that
of social and cultural activities taking place over online platforms, being the
contemporary market square. Yet, as it will be further explored below,
guaranteeing Digital Human Rights leads to a major problem: Human Rights
impose obligations on states, while online platforms are commercial-private
entities. The question, therefore, is whether some public law obligations may
nevertheless be imposed on the private sector as well, and if yes, then how.

41
42

43

44
45

Human Rights Council A/HRC/32/L.20 (June 30, 2016).
See Writ Petition, Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India and Ors. (civil) No. 1031 of 2019 ¶
152(b)(c) (2020) (“[T]he freedom of speech and expression and the freedom to practice any
profession or carry on any trade, business or occupation over the medium of internet enjoys
constitutional protection under Article 19(1)(a) and Article 19 (1) (g). The restriction upon such
fundamental rights should be in consonance with the mandate under Article 19 (2) and (6) of the
Constitution, inclusive of the test of proportionality. An order suspending internet services
indefinitely is impermissible under the Temporary Suspension of Telecom Services (Public
Emergency or Public Service) Rules, 2017, Suspension can be utilized for temporary duration only.”).
For scholarly works describing and analyzing this process, see Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/NewSchool Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2296, 2298 (2016); Klonick, supra note 16, at 1613–
15. For an early acknowledgment of Digital Human Rights, see Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil
Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV 61, 95–97, 99–103, 115–25 (2009).
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017).
Id. (“[T]o foreclose access to social media altogether is to prevent the user from engaging in the
legitimate exercise of First Amendment rights. . . . Even convicted criminals—and in some instances
especially convicted criminals—might receive legitimate benefits from these means for access to the
world of ideas, in particular if they seek to reform and to pursue lawful and rewarding lives.”).
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II. ONLINE RULERS AND CONTENT MONITORING

A. General Background
In contrast to the early utopian views of the digital environment as an
unregulated arena accomplishing the democratic freedom of speech ideal,46
the traffic of information and content, thereby of speech, is monitored by
various Internet actors, i.e. both ISPs and online platforms. This is what Jack
Balkin has described as the “new-school speech regulation,” which comprises
“techniques that regulate speech through the control of digital networks.”47
The various online intermediaries may monitor content and remove it in
accordance with various legal schemes. Exploring these schemes allows us to
better understand the challenges Digital Human Rights face.
The legal schemes for content removal could be classified into certain
categories. One such classification differentiates between content removal due
to violation of the online intermediary’s contractual terms, which is voluntary
removal of content, and content removal conducted due to imposed
regulation, which is nonvoluntary removal. The classification of content
monitoring according to whether it was conducted voluntarily or
nonvoluntarily is not sensitive enough to some further ramifications.
Voluntary removal of content may also be classified according to the initial
motivation: Some voluntary content removal is generated by commercial
contractual terms originally set by the platform operator, whereas others may
be initiated by public discourse and public activities that encouraged, or rather
compelled, the platform to adopt a higher standard of content filtering.48
Moreover, some of the seemingly voluntary policies adopted by online
platforms are a result of a fear or a threat of upcoming legislation.49 A common
46
47
48

49

See Benkler, supra note 12 and accompanying text (explaining how technology can lead to great
societal change).
Balkin, supra note 43, at 2306.
See Klonick, supra note 16, at 1664 (concluding that “platforms are economically responsive to the
expectations and norms of their users”); see also REBECCA MACKINNON, ANDI WILSON, & LIZ
WOOLERY, OPEN TECH INST., INTERNET FREEDOM AT A CROSSROADS: RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR THE 45TH PRESIDENT’S INTERNET FREEDOM AGENDA12 (2016) (describing how American
corporations have responded to government pressure by amending their terms of service).
See Danielle Keats Citron, Extremist Speech, Compelled Conformity, and Censorship Creep, 93
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035, 1047 (2018) (noting that even if EU lawmakers describe changes in
private speech practices as “voluntary,” in fact they are generated by governmental intervention);
Aswad, supra note 18, at 42–70 (discussing the adoption of codes of conduct against hate speech by
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legal mechanism used to promote the adoption of further voluntary terms is a
“code of conduct,” which is a self-regulation tool.50 The most well-known
example for such a code of conduct relates to the removal of illegal hate
speech. The European Union Commission have crafted a recommended
code of conduct, which was voluntarily adopted by major online platforms.51
This last example demonstrates the complexity of self-regulation measures,
which are not made of the same cloth: Some may reflect a self-serving need,
while others may reflect social regulation implemented by sophisticated
bottom-up mechanisms.52 In other words, self-regulation, known also as “soft
law,” may function as a useful substitute to traditional regulation imposing
duties on private actors.53
Nonvoluntary content removal, in contrast, may be generated by coercive
legislation or by a court order, based on either criminal law grounds,54 or on
civil law grounds, such as the one aimed at preventing the dissemination of
copyright infringing content.55 This last court order, known as a “blocking
order,” and the American and European regulated schemes for allegedly
copyright infringing content monitoring, will be further described in part III B
bellow.

50

51

52

53
54
55

major online corporations to meet the standards proposed by the UN); see also Bloch-Wehba, supra
note 5, at 46–47 (discussing how arrangements between governments and social media companies
have become increasingly less voluntary over time).
For the function of “codes of conduct” or “codes of best practices” as a self-regulation tool, see Julia
Black, Decentering Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a ‘PostRegulatory’ World, 54 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 103 (2001). In recent scholarly works, there is a
growing inspection of various types of self-ordering and their social function. See, e.g., Ira P. Robbins,
Best Practices on Best Practices: Legal Education and Beyond, 16 CLINICAL L. REV. 269, 289 (2009);
Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self-Regulation,
159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 423 (2011).
See VERA JOUROVÁ, EUR. COMM’N, CODE OF CONDUCT ON COUNTERING ILLEGAL HATE
SPEECH ONLINE: FIRST RESULTS ON IMPLEMENTATION (2016) (describing the adoption of the
code).
See Black, supra note 50, at 115 (explaining that for some, self-regulation denotes a kind of regulation
that is “responsive, flexible, informed, targeted, which prompts greater compliance, and which at
once stimulates and draws on the internal morality of the sector or organization being regulated,”
while for others, it denotes “self-serving” or “self-interested” regulation).
See Keller, supra 6, at 6 (criticizing the voluntary hate speech code of conduct).
See Directives, Article 5, 88/6 Official J. of the European Union 9 (2017) (recognizing content
removal as an effective measure against terrorism).
See, e.g., UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v. Constantin Film Verleih GmbH [2014) C-314/12
(approving an Austrian Court site-blocking order).
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Clearly, voluntary removal aims to serve commercial needs in its broadest
meaning.56 Even voluntary content removal initiated by public discourse, such
as those crafted by codes of conduct, still serves the platforms’ commercial
needs, since the voluntary compliance with soft social norms fosters the online
intermediary’s social legitimacy. Yet, in cases of both voluntary and
nonvoluntary monitoring activities that are initiated by public interest, a
commercial and private entity is fulfilling societal needs.57 In that sense, the
private entity is engaged in acts that normally would be conducted by public
agencies.58 This mixture of functions conducted by private entities brings into
the heart of the legal discourse the question of the legal nature of various
online rulers.

B. American and European Schemes for Infringing Content Monitoring
In the U.S., a significant legal framework allowing the practice of voluntary
content monitoring conducted by the digital intermediaries is set by the
Communications Decency Act (CDA).59 Article 230 of the CDA provides the
online intermediary with broad immunity from liability for user-generated
content posted on their “premises,” without prejudice to any other law. The
underlying rationale of the “safe harbor” given to online intermediaries is both
to encourage them to voluntarily, on a “Good Samaritan” basis, take an active
role in removing offensive content,60 and also to avoid free speech problems
of “collateral censorship.”61 Yet, this legal framework leaves online actors with
vast discretion on the matter, and in fact gives no concrete guidelines.
Therefore, voluntary content monitoring remains, to a large extent, a “black

56
57
58
59
60
61

See Klonick, supra note 16, at 1627 (noting economic reasons as the primary motive behind content
removal).
See Keller, supra 6, at 3-7 (describing various mechanisms by which governments stimulate private
entities to moderate digital speech in order to promote social goals).
Id.
47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
Id. § 230(b).
See Balkin, supra note 43, at 2309 (“Collateral censorship occurs when the state holds one private
party A liable for the speech of another private party B, and A has the power to block, censor, or
otherwise control access to B’s speech.”); Felix T. Wu, Collateral Censorship and the Limits of
Intermediary Immunity, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 293, 347–49 (2011) (detailing differences between
defamation and intellectual property claims with respect to immunity for intermediaries); Klonick,
supra note 16, at 1602 (discussing the rationale behind granting immunity to online intermediaries
for “user-generated content posted to their sites”).
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box.”62 Moreover, since Article 230 to the CDA does not offer immunity
based on intellectual property infringement, a special clause was enacted in
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA).63 Section 512 to the
Copyright Act creates a safe harbor for some online intermediaries in case an
infringing content passed traffic without their knowledge,64 and it establishes
the notice-and-takedown mechanism for all Internet intermediaries that
governs the monitoring of copyrighted content.
An extensively described, discussed, and documented outcome of the
notice-and-takedown regime, set by § 512 to the Copyright Act, is the
allowance of mass and easy removal of allegedly infringing copyrighted
content, ending up with a significant chilling effect to freedom of speech.65 The
various intermediaries, seeking the immunity, are incentivized to take down
all requested content, despite the fact that the request could have been found
unjustified had the case been decided by court.66 In other words, the
intermediaries have no incentive to invest time and effort in a profound legal
assessment of the requests, being an uninvolved third party in the conflict, and

62
63
64

65

66

See Klonick, supra note 16, at 1630–47, 1663 (describing, in detail and based on interviews the
“opaque” ways in which content is monitored voluntarily by the major online platforms).
17 U.S.C. § 512 (1988).
See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 30 (2d Cir. 2012) (discussing what constitutes
“knowledge” that would deprive immunity). For the ramifications of this case and its extensive
litigation until it was settled by the parties outside the court, see John T. Williams & Craig W.
Mandell, Winning the Battle, but Losing the War: Why the Second Circuit’s Decision in Viacom
Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc. is a Landmark Victory for Internet Service Providers , 41 AIPLA Q. J.
235 (2013).
See Jerome H. Reichman, Graeme B. Dinwoodie, & Pamela Samuelson, A Reverse Notice and
Takedown Regime to Enable Public Interest Uses of Technically Protected Copyrighted Works , 22
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 981 (2007) (calling for a reform that would allow the ban on the easy removal
of content); Jennifer M. Urban, Joe Karaganis, & Brianna Schofield, Notice and Takedown: Online
Service Provider and Rightsholder Accounts of Everyday Practice, 64 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A.
371 (2017) (describing the practices of the notice-and-takedown mechanism); Daniel Etcovitch,
DMCA § 512 Pain Points: Music and Technology Industry Perspectives in Juxtaposition , 30 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 547 (2017) (describing comments from both the music industry and the technology
industry with respect to the DMCA and their call for reform); DAPHNE KELLER, INTERNET
PLATFORMS: OBSERVATIONS ON SPEECH, DANGER, AND MONEY 18 (Hoover Institution, Aegis
Series Paper No. 1807, 2018) (discussing laws surrounding liability for intermediaries); Niva ElkinKoren & Maayan Perel, Guarding the Guardians: Content Moderation by Online Intermediaries and
the Rule of Law, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ONLINE INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY (2020) (posing
legal objections to content moderation and detailing “barriers to accountability in online content
moderation by intermediaries”).
See Balkin, supra note 43, at 2314 (highlighting the duty of the intermediary to “promptly remove”
content alleged to have infringed upon a party’s copyrights or risk liability).
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the outcome is a massive and uncontrolled removal of content.67 This
outcome is amplified by the operation of such mechanisms by automated
systems, since the indifferent position of the online intermediary is translated
into the design of the algorithm by setting the defaults. Thus, in the current
phase of online governance, the silencing mechanism is an algorithmic one.68
Another popular legal path for content monitoring is by “blocking orders,”
which are injunctions usually granted against ISPs, ordering them to block
access to a certain website or specific source of content, or even directly
ordering the removal of contents.69 However, blocking orders usually aim to
monitor infringing content at the infrastructural layer.70 Blocking orders have
been granted, occasionally and extensively, mainly in European countries,
including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Ireland, and the
United Kingdom.71 The European Court of Justice has approved this practice,
which is in line with the European Directives referring to the matter.72 Outside
67

68

69

70

71
72

See, e.g., Jeffrey Cobia, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act Takedown Notice Procedure:
Misuses, Abuses, and Shortcomings of the Process , 10 MINN. J. SCI. & TECH. 387, 390–93 (2009)
(noting abuses of current takedown practices, and particularly highlighting the fact that content is
often taken down that does not pose a copyright infringement).
See Niva Elkin-Koren & Maayan Perel, Separation of Functions for AI: Restraining Speech
Regulation by Online Platforms, SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK (Feb. 14, 2020),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3439261.
See, e.g., UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v. Constantin Film Verleih GmbH [2014] C-314/12
(approving an Austrian Court site-blocking order). It should be noted that injunctions ordering to
take down contents in the context of defamation law and hate speech, which are not at the focus of
this article, are also at the heart of the discourse concerning content monitoring. For example, in
October 2019, the European Court of Justice (EUCJ) ruled in the case C-18/18 Eva GlawischnigPiesczek v. Facebook Ireland Ltd., that the 2000/31/EC e-Commerce Directive does not preclude a
Member State from ordering a hosting provider to remove or block content that has been declared
unlawful. The Court also held that the Directive does not preclude Member states from ordering
such removal worldwide, and therefore left it to the Member States to determine the geographic
scope of the injunction. However, the Court left unconsidered the constitutional rights perspective.
For a review and criticism of this decision, mainly due to the fear that such monitoring may take
down legal speech, coined as “dolphins in the net,” see DAPHNE KELLER, DOLPHINS IN THE NET:
INTERNET CONTENT FILTERS AND THE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S GLAWISCHNIG-PIESCZEK V.
FACEBOOK IRELAND OPINION (2019) (identifying several problems and adverse consequences with
the Glawischnig-Piesczek decision).
See MARTIN HUSOVEC, INJUNCTIONS AGAINST INTERMEDIARIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION:
ACCOUNTABLE BUT NOT LIABLE? 19, 90 (2017) (discussing the broad definition of “intermediary”
and the responsibility of third parties and intermediaries in responding to blocking orders).
Id. at 184–210.
See, e.g., UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v. Constantin Film Verleih GmbH [2014] C-314/12
(approving an Austrian Court site-blocking order). For a critical review of the English High Court
and EUCJ approach to blocking orders, see Orit Fischman-Afori, Proportionality – A New Mega
Standard in European Copyright Law, 45 INST. INNOVATION & COMPETITION 889, 890 (2014).
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Europe, blocking orders are granted, for instance, in Australia73 and in Israel,74
and were recently approved by the Canadian Supreme Court in the case of
Google Inc. v. Equustek Solutions Inc, upholding an order according to which
Google should index all websites that sell goods violating a Canadian
company’s trade secrets worldwide.75 Arguably, blocking orders may be
granted on a global scale.76 Along with the § 512 safe harbors regime in the
U.S., in a recent case decided by the Virginia District Court (ACS v. Sci-Hub),77
the court surprisingly granted an order to block access to a website operated
from outside the U.S. that provided access to unlicensed scientific materials.
This decision, therefore, may signal a shift in the judiciary’s attitude to blocking
orders in the U.S. as well.78
The blocking orders scheme, like the notice-and-takedown, raises
concerns with respect to its impact on freedom of speech in the digital sphere.
Although the order is granted by Court, and therefore is clearly subject to
judicial oversight, it nevertheless generates controversy as to its underlying
policy and to its compatibility with applicable measures relating to
constitutional remedies, such as efficiency, necessity, and most importantly—
proportionality.79 The Courts are struggling with the question of whether
blocking orders are a proportionate remedy under the circumstances,80 and in
73

74
75
76

77
78
79

See Copyright Act 1968 § 115A (2019) (Austl.) (authorizing injunctions against intermediaries); see
also David Lindsay, Website Blocking Injunctions to Prevent Copyright Infringements:
Proportionality and Effectiveness, 40 U.N.S.W. L.J. 1507 (2017) (describing recent Australian court
decisions granting site blocking orders).
Section 53A of the Israeli Copyright Act 2007 (Amendment No. 5 2019) authorizes injunctions
against intermediaries.
Google Inc. v. Equustek Solutions Inc, 2017 SCC 34, para. 1-5 (Can.).
See Case C-18/18, Eva Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland Limited, 2019 Curia (approving
injunctions on a global scale). For a critical view on “global injunctions,” see, for example, Michael
Douglas, Extraterritorial Injunctions Affecting the Internet, 12 J. EQUITY 34 (2018) (considering the
power of courts to issue extraterritorial injunctions).
Am. Chem. Soc’y v. Sci-Hub, Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-0726 (2017).
See Maayan Perel, Digital Remedies, 35 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2020) (discussing digital
remedies).
See Fischman-Afori, supra note 72 (noting issues with blocking orders); see also, Althaf Marsoof,

The Blocking Injunction – A Critical Review of Its Implementation in the United Kingdom Within
the Legal Framework of the European Union (2015) (evaluating the blocking injunction in the United
Kingdom); Matthias Leistner, Intermediary Liability in a Global World, in PLURALISM OR
80

UNIVERSALISM IN INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW 471 (2019).
See, e.g., Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. British Telecomms. PLC, [2011] R.P.C. 28 (noting
the various factors that should be considered in order to conclude that a blocking order, granted in
accordance with specific authorization in the law, meets the proportionality requirement); Golden
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at least one case the EUCJ overruled a national blocking order for being
disproportionate.81 Yet, the dominant trend widely adopts this scheme.82
The imposition of active obligations on online intermediaries to monitor
content stood at the heart of the controversy relating to the European Union
Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, which was adopted in
spring 2019 (Copyright Single Market Directive).83 The underlying policy of
the Copyright Single Market Directive is to strengthen the position of
copyright owners vis-a-vis the various online platforms, considering what is
coined as the “value gap”—the gap between the economic value generated by
online platforms, and its fair share with content creators and copyright
owners.84 This development reflects the first legal move for applying
mandatory active content monitoring obligations on online rulers. The strong
opposition to the Copyright Digital Single Market Directive was based on fear
it would hinder Digital Human Rights, yet despite a large public outcry85 and
resistance of several member states, it was finally approved.86 Article 17 to the

81
82

83

84
85

86

Eye (Int’l) Ltd. v. Telefonica UK Ltd., [2012] EWHC 723 (UK) (weighing the rights of copyright
owners and consumers); EMI Records Ltd. v. British Sky Broad. Ltd. [2013] EWHC 379 (UK)
(granting a blocking order); Cartier Int’l v. British Sky Broad., [2014] EWHC 3794 (UK); Football
Ass’n Premier League Ltd. v. British Telecomms. [2017] EWHC 480 (UK) (considering whether a
blocking order is “appropriate and proportionate”).
See SABAM Cases, supra note 9 (discussing systems to filter information to prevent copyright
infringement).
See Fischman-Afori, supra note 72 (discussing a “proportionality test as a remedy-based measure in
the copyright” infringement context and the movement away from a bright-line decision of whether
to generally grant or reject a blocking injunction); Marsoof, supra note 79 (noting issues with blocking
injunctions).
Directive (EU) 2019/790, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on
copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and
2001/29/EC, 2019 O.J. (L 130) [hereinafter Copyright Digital Single Market Directive].
See KULK, supra note 3, at 61–62 (discussing a proposed directive that would help to “strengthen the
position of copyright owners”).
See, e.g., EU copyright bill: Protests across Europe highlight rifts over plans , DEUTSCHE WELLE
(Mar. 23, 2019), https://www.dw.com/en/eu-copyright-bill-protests-across-europe-highlight-rifts-overreform-plans/a-48037133 (noting how “[c]ritics of EU internet copyright reforms have rallied across
Europe ahead of a crucial vote in the European Parliament”); Cory Doctorow, The Worst Possible
Version of the EU Copyright Directive has Sparked a German Uprising , ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.
(Feb. 18, 2019), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/02/worst-possible-version-eu-copyright-directivehas-sparked-german-uprising (noting how “with just two days of organizing, hundreds of Europeans
marched on the streets of Cologne against Article 13”).
The final approval in spring 2019 was not unanimous: Three member states abstained and six voted
against. In a joint statement, the opposing member states explained that the Directive may encroach
on EU citizens’ rights, and therefore, they have voted against its adoption. See KULK, supra note 3,

April 2021]

HYBRID BODIES

371

Copyright Single Market Directive contains a line of obligations on “online
content sharing service provider,” including an obligation to obtain an
authorization from rightsholders with respect to any copyrighted work that is
intended to be communicated by their services;87 in the absence of such
authorization the intermediary should demonstrate that best efforts were made
to prevent the availability of specific works identified by rightsholders.88 Upon
notification by rightsholders, the intermediary should act expeditiously to
remove these works,89 and the intermediary should “provide rightsholders, at
their request, with adequate information on the functioning of their practices
with regard to the cooperation referred to" concerning removal of content.”90
Moreover, Article 17 (9) obliges the intermediaries to establish an effective
and expeditious complaint and redress mechanism, in the service of users
disputing over the removal of content, e.g. wishing to benefit from exceptions
or limitations to copyright. The complaints should be "processed without
undue delay" and decisions to remove content following such complaints will
be "subject to human review".” This Article further stresses that “Member
States shall also ensure that out-of-court redress mechanisms are available for
the settlement of disputes[,]" that such mechanism shall enable disputes "to be
settled impartially[,]" and that users shall not be deprived of the legal protection
afforded by their national law and have "access to a court or another relevant
judicial authority.”91
The first EU measure to address an Internet intermediary’s liability was
the e-Commerce Directive adopted in 2000,92 which established immunity for
the intermediaries on various legal grounds—albeit with no mandatory noticeand-takedown scheme, which could nevertheless be adopted voluntarily.93
Article 17 to the Copyright Single Market Directive moves to a mandatory
adoption of a nuanced notice-and-takedown scheme, but these schemes were

87
88
89
90
91
92

93

at 63 (explaining that these member states felt that the text of the approved directive would stifle
innovation).
Copyright Digital Single Market Directive, supra note 83, at 119.
Id. at 120.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 120–21.
Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 8, 2000 on certain
legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market
(Directive on electronic commerce), 2000 O.J. (L 178) [hereinafter EU e-Commerce Directive].
Following the EU e-Commerce Directive, Finland is the only EU member state that has adopted a
statutory notice-and-takedown mechanism. KULK, supra note 3, at 117.
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in fact already adopted in a self-regulatory manner.94 Therefore, it is very likely
that the same extensively described, discussed, and documented chilling effect
of the American notice-and-takedown scheme95 already takes place in Europe
as well. Yet, Article 17 contains additional, far-reaching active obligations for
content monitoring, such as the obligation to make "best efforts", in fulfilling
the duty to have rightsholders’ authorization for the use of their content, and
also to make best efforts in accordance with "high industry standards of
professional diligence" to ensure the unavailability of content the rightholder
indicated.96 These obligations are in fact referring to implementation of
content recognition technologies, similar to the “content ID” systems applied
voluntarily by YouTube.97 The difference, however, is that in contrast to the
notice-and-takedown scheme in which the online ruler is responsive to a
conflict initiated by a third party, Article 17 shifts the liability to the online
ruler to proactively initiate the process of obtaining authorization and thereby
of content filtering and removal through content recognition technologies.
Moreover, Article 17 includes a “staydown” active obligation, aimed at making
sure that there is no reuploading of removed content.98 Content ID systems
likewise raised the concern of generating a chilling effect on digital speech,
since, it may, for example, block the use of copyrighted content that could
have been qualified as fair use and therefore non-infringing.99 In other words,
94
95
96
97

98

99

See KULK, supra note 3, at 116–120 (discussing the notice-and-takedown scheme).
See supra note 65.
Copyright Digital Single Market Directive, supra note 83, at 120. See also Article 17(4)(b)–(c).
KULK, supra note 3, at 133 (noting the possibility of making “effective content recognition
technologies” mandatory). For the operation of the YouTube content ID system, see YouTube
Creators,
YouTube
Content
ID,
YOUTUBE
(Sept.
28,
2010),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9g2U12SsRns.
See Copyright Digital Single Market Directive, supra note 83, at 120 (Article 17 (4) (c)) stipulates that
the service providers should make "best efforts to prevent their future uploads in accordance with
point (b)"). See also Felipe Romero-Moreno, Notice and Staydown and Social Media: Amending
Article 13 of the Proposed Directive on Copyright, 33 INT’L REV. L. COMPUTERS & TECH. 187,
203–04 (2019) (discussing “‘notice and staydown’ duties, under which a regular takedown notification
from a rightholder for a specific unlawful file would trigger a duty for the service provider to
proactively identify and eliminate all instances of the allegedly infringing content and prevent future
uploads”).
See, e.g., Taylor B. Bartholomew, Note, The Death of Fair Use in Cyberspace: YouTube and the
Problem with Content ID, 13 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 66, 68 (2015) (emphasis omitted) (“[The
Content ID system] has proven to be problematic in its application on YouTube by undermining the
doctrine of fair use through indiscriminate flagging of legitimate uses of original content. Put simply,
Content ID is blatantly hostile to users’ interests because it shifts the neutral presumption of fair use
against them.”); Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Accountability in Algorithmic Copyright
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an automated system may produce “false positives” outcomes, which are
inconsistent with freedom of speech as the default principle.100 Moreover, the
major obstacle with content recognition technologies is that they are run by
private entities, which are not compelled to reveal the design of their
algorithm; therefore these systems are operated with no safeguards in place
for the protection of users and the public at large.101 As one commentator
concluded, private entities such as Google and YouTube “have adopted a role
for [themselves] that is similar to a collective management organization, but
without there being any checks on its practices.”102 Users become dependent
on the good intentions of online rulers to provide adequate protection to their
rights and freedoms.

C. A Broader Perspective on Content Monitoring and “Digital Human
Rights”
Online rulers are private corporations, motivated by profit. Yet, as
presented above, some of their activities, such as content monitoring, raise
profound questions concerning the protection of Digital Human Rights. Since
content monitoring is governed by these private entities’ own voluntary
policies or their own technology, even if they were obliged to implement such
measures, these measures would lack basic elements embedded in public law
guarantees of human rights, such as accountability, transparency, reasoning,
and equality.103 The fear is that these intermediaries would moderate digital

Enforcement, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 473 (2016); Martin Senftleben, Christina Angelopoulos,
Giancarlo Frosio, Valentina Moscon, Miquel Peguera, & Ole Andreas Rognstad, The
Recommendation on Measures to Safeguard Fundamental Rights and the Open Internet in the
Framework of the EU Copyright Reform, 40 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 149, 187 (2018) (referring
to European style exceptions that could be undermined by such monitoring systems).
100 See Toni Lester & Dessislava Pachamanova, The Dilemma of False Positives: Making Content ID
Algorithms More Conducive to Fostering Innovative Fair Use in Music Creation, 24 UCLA ENT. L.
REV. 51, 53 (2017) (claiming that “these programs can produce ‘false positives,’ where legally
allowable music associated with a reference file is inappropriately blocked”).
101 See, e.g., Senftleben et al., supra note 99, at 4 (pointing that "the decision over the scope and reach
of filtering measures must not be left to agreements between industry representatives that are likely
to focus on cost and efficiency considerations instead of seeking to avoid unnecessary content
censorship.")
102 See KULK, supra note 3, at 284.
103 These elements are regarded as the underlying principles of public and administrative law. See
STEPHEN BREYER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & REGULATORY POLICY (3d ed. 1992); Cary
Coglianese, Administrative Law: The U.S. and Beyond, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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speech too heavily, or on a capricious or discriminatory basis, and they would
thereby risk freedom of speech and all other nuanced Digital Human Rights.104
As stressed above, while this fear was relevant in the pre-digital era with respect
to traditional media and press as well,105 the global reach and gigantic size of
some online rulers not only amplifies the problem but in fact changes the
democratic balance.
Jack Balkin described this new triangular social structure, in which a third
angle is found in addition to public authorities and individuals—online
intermediaries. Nowadays, the threat to human rights, and particularly to
freedom of speech, is created not only by governmental authorities but to an
even greater extent by private entities governing the online traffic of content.106
A growing mass of scholarly works is turning the spotlight onto this new global
challenge, in which Digital Human Rights are mainly threatened by private
sector entities whose own policies are not governed by basic public law
guarantees.107 For example, the dominancy of the online platforms in the
democratic free speech environment was described as the “new governors,”
namely the controllers of the free flow of expressions;108 as a private law activity
that stands at the “shadows” of the state;109 or as “nonstate regulators” of the
public sphere.110 Moreover, since such control is usually carried out by

104
105
106
107

108
109
110

SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES, (James D. Wright, ed., 2d ed. 2015) (discussing the “salient
political theory and legal issues fundamental to the U.S. administrative state but with relevance to the
design and application of administrative law in any jurisdiction”); Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1946); see also Klonick, supra note 16, at 1609, 1665–69 ( “There is very little
transparency from these private platforms, making it hard to accurately assess the extent to which we
should be concerned about speech regulation, censorship, and collateral censorship.”); BlochWehba, supra note 5, at 61 (noting how some have argued that “speech governance by online
platforms is inappropriate because the companies are not chosen through a democratic process”).
See Kyle Langvardt, A New Deal for the Online Public Sphere, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. 341, 349
(2018) (discussing certain speech-related risks that these intermediaries raise).
See supra notes 22–25 and accompanying text.
See Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech is a Triangle, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2011, 2011 (2018) (arguing that
social media companies govern digital speech).
For one of the earliest scholarly writings on the matter, see Paul Schiff Berman, Cyberspace and the
State Action Debate: The Cultural Value of Applying Constitutional Norms to “Private” Regulation,
71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1263, 1265–66 (2000) (discussing how web sites set their own terms and
conditions which become the “law” of their pages).
See Klonick, supra note 16, at 1663 (describing private, online platforms as the new regulators free
speech).
See Bloch-Wehba, supra note 5, at 33–34 (establishing their own legal structures that online
platforms believed would work better than the physical world).
See Langvardt, supra note 104, at 342 (describing the regulations put in place by internet companies
to shape speech on their platforms).
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automated algorithms, these “new governors” and “nonstate regulators” may
turn out to be machines operated via artificial intelligence, generating new legal
challenges for both private and public laws.111 Yet, both the research and legal
structuring of this troubling phenomenon are still in their first steps.
The U.N. Human Rights Commission, as described above, gave special
attention to freedom of expression in the digital environment, and particularly
to its safeguards on social media platforms. The first Report of the Special
Rapporteur on the matter, issued in 2011, reflected both a comprehensive
acknowledgment of the important role online platforms served in
contemporary social structure,112 and of the necessity to set rules and legal
boundaries to content monitoring carried out by these bodies. The Report
opened by articulating the basic principle according to which:
Censorship measures should never be delegated to private entities, and that
intermediaries should not be held liable for refusing to take action that
infringes individuals’ human rights. Any requests submitted to intermediaries
to prevent access to certain content, or to disclose private information for
strictly limited purposes such as administration of criminal justice, should be
done through an order issued by a court or a competent body which is
independent of any political, commercial or other unwarranted influences.
In other words, the Report stated that nonvoluntary specific content
blocking should be carried out by a specific court order. Moreover, it stated
that online platforms should serve as gatekeepers in protecting human rights.114
The Report further elaborated some concrete obligations stemming from the
duty of online platforms to safeguard human rights in the context of content
monitoring: Content monitoring should be transparent to both the relevant
individuals and to the public; it should apply proportionate measures such as
providing a forewarning if possible, and minimize the restriction strictly to the
113

111 See Sofia Grafanaki, Platforms, the First Amendment and Online Speech: Regulating the Filters, 39
PACE L. REV. 111, 122–23 (2018) (discussing the conundrum in trying to regulate fake news);
Langvardt, supra note 104, at 349–50 (referring to platforms’ ability to silo users or curate their
information); Keller, supra note 6 (describing the fear that general content monitoring, especially
when conducted by algorithms, would silence legal speech).
112 See Report of the Special Rapporteur 2011, supra note 34(stating the importance of a generally free
and open internet).
113 Id. at 75.
114 This last principle was further stated upfront: “[W]hile States are the primary duty-bearers of human
rights, the Special Rapporteur underscores that corporations also have a responsibility to respect
human rights, which means that they should act with due diligence to avoid infringing the rights of
individuals.” The Report of the Special Rapporteur 2011, supra note 38, at 76.
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necessary content involved (i.e. the restriction should be proportionate).115
These statements marked the first step of an institutional-public discourse
regarding the need to tilt the ‘human rights ship’ towards the private sector’s
duties and obligations. And, keeping with the naval metaphor, the Report of
the Special Rapporteur of the U.N. Human Rights Commission functions as
a signal given by the central lighthouse on shore.
The second Report of the Special Rapporteur, issued on the matter in
2018, was based on a global survey seeking to sketch an actual and empirical
picture with respect to voluntary and nonvoluntary content monitoring
practices.116 The overall finding was that, on a global scale, freedom of speech
is not protected adequately by the private sector. While many companies have
adopted some measure of compliance with standards aimed at preventing state
censorship (i.e. nonvoluntary content monitoring), the rest of voluntary
content monitoring has not met appropriate standards of transparency and
nondiscrimination.117 Moreover, another troubling finding in this survey was
that content monitoring is often carried out by automated methods, namely
algorithmic decision-making processes, which are unaccountable to any results
affecting individuals’ human rights.118 It should be mentioned that the official
U.S. response to this survey was somewhat laconic: It emphasized the limited
volume of nonvoluntary content monitoring obligations in the U.S.,119 while
with respect to voluntary content monitoring it simply mentioned that “internet
companies, of their own volition, may and do remove online content that
violates their terms of service.”120 The final Report, therefore, concluded that
115 Id. at 76–77.
116 See Special Rapporteur on the Protection and Promotion of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and
Expression, Overview of submission received in preparation of the Report of the Special Rapporteur,
2–3 (A/HRC/38/35), A/HRC/38/35/Add.1. (June 6, 2018) (describing the compilation of
submissions for the report).
117 The overview of submissions received in preparation of the Report of the Special Rapporteur also
referred to a research conducted by The Danish Institute for Human Rights, that “shows that
company commitments to human rights only extend to ‘protecting against external threats from
governments.’” Danish Institute for Human Rights, Rikke Jørgensen, Framing Human Rights:
Exploring Storytelling Within Internet Companies at 4; see id. at 42.
118 See id. at 40–49.
119 See Letter from Jason B. Mack, U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative to the U.N. Human Rights
Council, to David Kaye, Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Opinion and Expression U.S. Response to Request for Submissions on Social Media,
Search, and Freedom of Expression (April 10, 2018), (”As a general matter, U.S. law does not impose
an obligation on internet companies to remove, restrict, or otherwise regulate online content that is
protected under the First Amendment.”)
120 Id.
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“[d]espite taking steps to illuminate their rules and government interactions,
the companies remain enigmatic regulators, establishing a kind of ‘platform
law’ in which clarity, consistency, accountability and remedy are elusive.”121
The Report further elaborates some concrete recommendations as to the
appropriate way to face these challenges. A special emphasis was given to the
need to make the private sector’s companies subject to human rights
obligations, and to turn civil compliance to basic human rights into the default
standard.122 More specifically, according to the Report, “Companies should
incorporate directly into their terms of service and ‘community standards’
relevant principles of human rights law that ensure content-related actions will
be guided by the same standards of legality, necessity and legitimacy that bind
State regulation of expression.”123
Finally, the Special Rapporteur’s clear voice on the matter was heard once
again with respect to then proposed provision of the Copyright Digital Single
Market Directive, eventually adopted in Article 17 described above, which
imposes far-reaching active obligations on major online rulers in order to
strengthen rightsholders’ economic interests. In an open letter, the Special
Rapporteur expressed his concerns that this (then-proposed) provision was
incompatible with both Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (securing freedom of speech) and Article 15 of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (securing
the right to participate in cultural life).124 He further expressed fear that this
obligation could lead to “pressure on content sharing providers to err on the
side of caution,” pointing at the known chilling effect that stems from the riskaverse behavior of a uninvolved third party.125 The Special Rapporteur also
referred to the lack of requirement of prior judicial review in the thenproposed provisions, currently adopted in Article 17, and subsequently stated
that “intermediaries must not be required to restrict content unless an order
has been issued by an independent and impartial judicial authority that has
determined that the material at issue is unlawful,” in order to prevent
censorship in the digital sphere.126 As described above, the mechanism finally

121
122
123
124

Report of the Special Rapporteur 2018, supra note 37, at ¶ 1.
See id. at 44–48, 70–72 (setting out principles for responsible content monitoring).
Id. at 45.
David Kaye, Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of
Opinion and Expression, U.N. Doc. OL OTH 41/2018, 3–8 (June 13, 2018).

125
126

Id.
Id.
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adopted in Article 17 does not follow this recommended path and it obliges
online service providers to remove content upon rightsholders' request, with
no prior judicial order.

D. The Public/Private Divide Barrier
The recommendation in the second Report of the Special Rapporteur
raises the general issue of introducing public law principles into the private
sector and the question of how such a legal move should be implemented defacto. A few scholars have already stressed the need to accommodate online
platforms’ activities to human rights standards.127 In line with this scholarly
movement, Jack Balkin proposed that private law fiduciary duties should be
applied to some Internet platforms.128 However, the legal way for imposing
such standards has not yet been profoundly explored. Voluntary acceptance
of minimal public law standards, on a “Good Samaritan” basis, seems to be
inadequate, considering the growing importance online rulers play in the
societal democratic structure.129 Imposition of public law duties may be carried
out, therefore, either by legislation or by judicial doctrine.
An example of a legislative path was proposed by a few scholars, suggesting
that any content monitoring and removal would be subject to either
administrative, special advisory council, or judicial prior review and approval,
to ensure that it complies with free speech principles.130 The Special

127 See, e.g., Evelyn Mary Aswad, The Future of Freedom of Expression Online, 17 DUKE L. & TECH.
REV. 26, 38–40 (2019) (proposing which terms should be inserted into the online platforms contracts
in order to promote guarantees for freedom of speech that are in line with the international law
standards); see also Noa Mor, No Longer Private: On Human Rights and the Public Facet of Social
Network Sites, 47 HOFSTRA L. REV. 651, 654 (2018) (proposing to impose some public law
principles upon private bodies operating social network sites such as Facebook, due to the impact on
users’ basic human rights); Langvardt, supra note 104, at 380–81 (proposing a new approach to the
nonstate regulators, i.e. online platforms, according to which they would be perceived as state
agencies).
128 See Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1183, 1205 (2016) (arguing that the government should regulate certain kinds of private information).
129 For a similar view, see Langvardt, supra note 104, at 348 (stating that social platforms are destroying
users’ abilities to hear conflicting views); Bloch-Wehba, supra note 5, at 63 (discussing the
cooperation between public and private agencies in enforcing speech regulations). For the view that
self-regulation is still the recommended way to tackle content monitoring, see Klonick, supra note
14, at 1666.
130 See Langvardt, supra note 104, at 355 (discussing the ways in which online content could be
moderated); Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Online Content Moderation, 106 GEO. MASON L. REV.
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Rapporteur, in his open letter concerning the Copyright Single Market
Directive described above, expressed a similar view.131 Concerns were raised
as to whether such proposals are workable, due to the immense burden on
the administrative agencies.132 Prior administrative or even judicial approval
for any act is unrealistic. Moreover, any proposed legislation should be highly
attentive to potential counter chilling effects on the freedom of speech and
should be careful not to undermine altogether the online rulers’ activities and
digital free speech.133
An example of a judicial doctrine, proposed as a potential vehicle for
imposing public law obligations on online platforms, is perceiving the
platforms as “newspaper editors” or “media broadcasters” who are thus willing
collaborators with government censorship, acting as “arms of the state.”134 Yet,
this doctrine is rather limited, and it does not generate an overall legal
framework with the guarantees needed for the adoption of human rights
standards, such as accountability, transparency, reasoning, and equality in all
cases of content monitoring.135 This mechanism, at best, may be appropriate
for extreme cases of state censorship, concerning issues such as national
security or child pornography, and is not apt for every day content monitoring,

131

132
133

134
135

1353, 1357, 1376 (2018) (proposing that the policy for content monitoring would be approved by
court or an administrative body in order for the platform to enjoy a safe-harbor clause that would be
legislated on a Federal level). For a similar proposal, in the context of the “Right to be Forgotten,”
see Edward Lee, Recognizing Rights in Real Time: The Role of Google in the EU Right to Be
Forgotten, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1017, 1035 (2016). Hannah Bloch-Wehba has proposed that
non-governmental regulatory bodies, such as ICANN, which are in fact “meta-regulators,” should
bridge the private/public gap and create standards that all can adhere to, supra note 5, at 71.
See Kaye, supra note 124, at 1, 9 (discussing the then European Commission’s proposed provision,
currently adopted in Article 17 to the Copyright Digital Single Market Directive, which requires
“online content sharing service providers” to monitor copyright-protected content).
See Bloch-Wehba, supra note 5, at 64–65 (discussing the concern in light of increasingly privatized
government roles).
These fears have led to the legislation of the vast immunity found in § 230 of the CDA. See Danielle
Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad Samaritans § 230
Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 404 (2017) (discussing the overbroad interpretation of the
legislation). However, it was further argued that some adjustments to § 230 should be crafted in
order to prevent illegal activities. See id. at 404 (”[W]ith modest adjustments to § 230, either through
judicial interpretation or legislation, we can have a robust culture of free speech online without
shielding from liability platforms designed to host illegality or that deliberately host illegal content.”);
Klonick, supra note 16, at 1666 (arguing any proposed legislation must align with the existing selfregulatory structure in order to be effective).
See Klonick, supra note 14, at 1609; Bloch-Wehba, supra note 5, at 61.
Bloch-Wehba, supra note 5, at 61.

380

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 23:2

concerning issues such as copyright infringement.136 Moreover, the massive
amount of content flow and the need for fast responsiveness on digital
platforms make these legal tools ineffective and therefore obsolete.137
These examples feed into the feeling of legal helplessness in recent
scholarly writing and public discourse, created by the gap between the
acknowledgement of the urgent need to introduce basic human rights
standards to the operation of online platforms and the seeming lack of ability
to initiate such legal move.138 Nevertheless, in the following parts we will
examine a comprehensive legal doctrine that may serve as a vehicle or
underlying force for the needed legal move of imposing human rights
standards on private online intermediaries.
III. THE PERCOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS INTO THE
PRIVATE SPHERE

A. General Background
The scholarship pertaining to the currently described threat to free speech
in the digital environment hits a major stumbling block: Although it
acknowledges the necessity to apply human rights standards to online actors,

136 An indicative example of a refusal of online platforms to remove content, despite government
requests, is described by Kate Klonick, based on interviews with officials in the online platforms’
companies. These interviews reveal that when it comes to high profile issues, such as “Wikileaks,”
then special attention is given to the balance of the various interests at stake. See Klonick, supra note
16, at 1622–25 (discussing the recognition such companies get for their pushback to government).
However, it is unreasonable to expect that day-to-day requests for content removal would be treated
similarly, though should be subject to a structured fair process as well.
137 See Langvardt, supra note 104, at 354 (“Facebook alone today employs several thousand content
moderators who reportedly evaluate about one piece of content every ten seconds.”).
138 See, e.g., Bloch-Wehba, supra note 5, at 80 (concluding that “platforms must take on these tasks
themselves rather than waiting for government to act, because to wait is to allow the structures of
private ordering to be coopted by state censors.”); Klonick, supra note 16, at 1602 (explaining that
“scholars have moved between optimistic and pessimistic views of platforms and have long debated
how — or whether — to constrain them”); Langvardt, supra note 104, at 349 (concluding that though
there is an extensive literature around the risk to freedom of speech by the platforms, and various
proposals to regulate them, there are nevertheless “few policy proposals that contain any detail about
how to implement this kind of regulation, and thus far no one in any government has shown any
interest in them”); see also Thomas E. Kadri & Kate Klonick, Facebook v. Sullivan: Public Figures
and Newsworthiness in Online Speech, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 37, 38 (2019) (describing the current
voluntary solution Facebook adopts, by creating an “Oversight Board that will hopefully provide due
process to users on the platform’s speech decisions and transparency about how content-moderation
policy is made . . . .”).
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the imposition of such principles becomes complicated since these actors are
private entities.139 This is the result of a dichotomic perception, according to
which either a certain body is a state actor governed by public law, or else it is
a private entity completely free from public law principles. The controversial
American state action doctrine, adhering to this dichotomic perception, will
be further described in following Part III.B.
Modern law perceptions encompass a much more complex social
structure, perceiving the public/private law divide as a continuous spectrum of
contingencies, according to the extent of applicable public law principles.
While with respect to state actors, such as the government and state
administration bodies, public law principles should be applied in full, there
are further along the curve in-between situations of non-state actors that
nevertheless would be subject to some public law principles. The extent of
applicability of public law principles may vary according to the strength of the
potential conflict with human rights. The understanding that the application
of public law principles is not binary but rather a dynamic range of situations,
with varied impositions of human rights standards, is the outcome of a gradual
process in which public law principles have percolated into the private law
sphere. These new, dynamic perceptions will be further described in Part
IIIV.C.
A prominent doctrine primarily adopted in European countries, dubbed
“hybrid bodies,” applies a dynamic perception of the public/private divide.
This doctrine will be explored in Part III.D. Then, finally, in Chapter IV,
loose ends will be tied up, and the possible application of the hybrid bodies
doctrine to online rulers will be explored.

B. The U.S. State Action Doctrine
The “state action” doctrine refers to a constitutional principle developed
by the U.S. Supreme Court, according to which the U.S. Constitution and its
individual proclaimed rights apply only to state action and not to private
action.140 State action refers to all government actions, including those carried
139 See Klonick, supra note 16, at 1659 (arguing it is unlikely online platforms could be considered state
actors).
140 See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 18 (1883) (holding that Congress lacked the power to enact
legislation regulating private racial discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment); Developments
in the Law: State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1248, 1250 (2010)
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out by the executive, legislature, and judiciary at both state and federal levels.
In contrast, private action refers to all nongovernmental actions.141 Therefore,
for instance, private discrimination is not actionable under the 14th
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which proclaims the state’s
nondiscriminatory principle, in the absence of federal and state statutory law
to the contrary.142 The state action doctrine applies to the constitutional
safeguard of free speech as well.143
The state action doctrine raises many questions, some controversial, as to
its limits, boundaries, and justification.144 One of the doctrine’s greatest
conundrums is drawing a clear line between a state actor and a non-state
actor.145 Many court decisions found creative ways to impute state action in

141
142

143

144

145

(“In the Civil Rights Cases, the Supreme Court laid down the bright-line rule of state action . . . .”);
Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 504 (1985) (“State action
doctrines remain the dividing line between the public sector, which is controlled by the Constitution,
and the private sector, which is not.”).
See Developments in the Law: State Action and the Public/Private Distinction , supra note 140, at
1256–61 (describing the early developments of this conceptual divide).
The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution proclaims: “No state shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,
407 U.S. 163, 178–179 (1972) (holding that a private restaurant or bar may discriminate its cliental);
Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357–358 (1974) (holding that mere approval by a state
utility commission of a business practice does not constitute state action).
See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520–21 (1976) (rejecting a free speech claim against a private
mall). For a review of similar cases, see Jennifer Niles Coffin, The United Mall of America: Free
Speech, State Constitutions, and the Growing Fortress of Private Property, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
615, 622–30 (2000) (discussing a line of cases that hold mall owners cannot suppress free speech on
their premises); Developments in the Law: State Action and the Public/Private Distinction , supra
note 140, at 1311–12.
See, Chemerinsky, supra note 140, at 506 (advocating for the abolition of the state action doctrine);
Michael J. Phillips, The Inevitable Incoherence of Modern State Action Doctrine, 28 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 683, 683 (1984) (describing the incoherent application of the doctrine); Gary Peller & Mark
Tushnet, State Action and a New Birth of Freedom, 92 GEO. L. J. 779, 789 (2004) (calling for the
doctrine’s abolishment); Developments in the Law: State Action and the Public/Private Distinction ,
supra note 140, at 1313 (“[T]he continuing debate is further evidence that in an era in which public
use and private ownership collide increasingly often, a court’s theory of state action on private
property can have serious implications.”).
See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13, 22–23 (1948) (holding that if a private individual or entity
merely enters into a discriminatory contract it is not state action, but judicial enforcement of such a
contractual right would be qualified as a state action).
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cases involving racism operated by private actors,146 yet these decisions
amplified the stance that the concept of state action is both easily manipulated
and inherently incoherent.147 Whether limited or not, the state action doctrine
reflects the basic American legal core principle that constitutional rights are to
protect individuals from the power of the state and not to regulate relations
between individuals, which is left to private law. Moreover, the state action
doctrine adheres to the underlying U.S. constitutional rationale that preserves
an area of individual freedom, out of reach of the state.148
Within attempts to avoid the ill-consequences of the state action doctrine,
certain decisions crafted exemptions that stretched the concept of state actor.
For instance, in the seminal case of Marsh v. Alabama, the Supreme Court
indicated that discriminatory action conducted by a private actor may be
imputed as state action if it involved an exercise of a “public function.”149 In
emulating a private property to a public sphere area, the Supreme Court held
that “the more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by
the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the
statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it.”150 This ruling was
further expanded to shopping malls, being private properties serving public
utility.151 Yet, this route was eventually overruled by subsequent decisions.152
Another known attempt to elaborate an exemption to the state action doctrine
was in the landmark case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, in which the
Supreme Court ruled that a state court decision enforcing common law rules
regarding defamation (discussing a state official’s claims against a privately
146 See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth. 365 U.S. 715, 726 (1961) (holding that a private restaurant’s
policy of racial discrimination qualified as state action because the restaurant leased space from a
government agency).
147 See Phillips, supra note 144, at 697 (discussing how Burton advanced the Court’s “doctrinal
diffusion”).
148 Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936–37 (1982). See also Berman, supra note 107, at
1268 (arguing that although the critique concerning the incoherence of the public/private divide is
correct, nevertheless “most Americans are likely to resist, on an intuitive level, scholarly attempts to
erode the distinction between public and private. Most of us like to believe that there are spheres of
privacy in which we exist, untouched by the state”).
149 See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946) (holding that a privately-owned mining town was
nevertheless perceived as a “quasi-municipality” for anti-discrimination purposes).
150 Id.
151 See Amalgamated Food Emps. Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 325 (1968) (holding
the mall was the functional equivalent of a “business block” and should be treated as such for First
Amendment purposes).
152 See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518 (1976) (stating that “the rationale of Logan Valley did not
survive the Court’s decisions in [Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner]”).
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owned newspaper) had an impact upon free speech and press rights and
therefore created a state action that had triggered the application of
constitutional rules of free speech.153 Nevertheless, despite these and other
exemptions, most court decisions tend to tighten the standard against a finding
of “state action.” The common assertion is that it is not enough that a private
party has acted under some nexus to the state, such as acting under state
regulation or license, and it is necessary to establish that the actions were
attributable to the state.154 In line of this rigid trend, the Supreme Court held
in June 2019 in the case of Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck
that, once again, a private company running a television network is not a “state
actor,” even if it operates under a contract with the City of New York, and
therefore it is not bound to freedom of speech.155
The current Supreme Court’s approach has been described as a return to
the early formalistic approach.156 Some scholars perceive this trend as
foreclosing any potential application of U.S. constitutional rights in the private
sector.157 And more specifically, the Manhattan Community Access Corp. v.
Halleck ruling could be perceived as a clear sign of the Supreme Court’s
refusal to impose public law standards, headed by freedom of speech, on
online social media private services,158 despite the acknowledgment of social
media networks as the digital public market square in the Packingham v. North
Carolina case.159
Considering the current formalistic approach of the U.S. Supreme Court
to the state action doctrine, which seems to foreclose the path for a direct
application of freedom of speech on private entities, various proposals have
been made seeking to solve the problem of control over free speech by major
153 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964).
154 Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978).
155 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1931 (2019) (reaching the holding by a 5-4 decision). But see id. at 1934 (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the private company stepped into the City’s shoes and thus should have
been qualified as a “state actor,” who is then subject to the First Amendment).
156 For a review of the evolvement of the state action doctrine until its current restrictive phase, see
Jonathan Peters, The “Sovereigns of Cyberspace” and State Action: The First Amendment’s
Application—Or Lack Thereof—To Third-Party Platforms, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 989, 996–99
(2017) (arguing that the Supreme Court ruling in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000),
reflects the current formalistic trend).
157 See Peters, supra note 156, at 998 (discussing the boundaries between the private sector and
constitutional rights).
158 See Keller, supra note 6, at 21–22 (arguing Halleck will unlikely “affect internet platforms directly”).
159 See Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735 (describing the Internet and social media in particular as the
most important place for the exchange of ideas).
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online rulers. Many scholars have stressed the need to entirely abolish the
state action doctrine.160 Whereas chances for such a legal move are low,
Jonathan Peters proposed to look for a solution through state legislation in
contrast to federal constitutional law: For instance, in California, the principle
of freedom of speech is anchored as a right of every person to free speech and
not as an obligation of the state to refrain from limiting free speech.
Therefore, such a difference allows in California a broader application of
freedom of speech on private properties as well—an application which was
approved by the Supreme Court.161 Since many of the major online rulers are
based in California, this was the proposed path for imposing free speech
standards on the private sector.162 Alternatively, many expressed the need to
ease the state action doctrine following the flexible interpretation given to the
private/public divide in Marsh v. Alabama.163 Klonick, in contrast, reached the
conclusion that imposition of free speech standards are not realistic in light of
American public law principles. Therefore, she argues that a better path
would be the voluntary one, facilitated by complex social structures and
market needs.164
Following these scholarly attempts to turn free speech standards into an
obligatory principle in the private sector, albeit on solid grounds and on a
more global scale, the general percolation of human rights into the private
sphere will be further described in following Part III.C.

C. Dynamic Perceptions of the Public/Private Legal Spheres
The traditional divide between public and private legal spheres has been
challenged for decades, and there have been prominent legal developments

160 See Peller and Tushnet, supra note 144, at 789 (“The state action doctrine is analytically incoherent
because, as Hohfeld and Hale demonstrated, state regulation of so-called private conduct is always
present, as a matter of analytic necessity, within a legal order. There is no region of social life that
even conceptually can be marked off as ‘private’ and free from governmental regulation.”);
Chemerinsky, supra note 140, at 506 (“The conclusion which emerges is that limiting the
Constitution’s protections of individual rights to state action is anachronistic, harmful to the most
important personal liberties, completely unnecessary, and even detrimental to the very goals that it
originally intended to accomplish.”).
161 Peters, supra note 156, at 1001–04.
162 Id. at 1001–02.
163 See Peters, supra note 156, at 1022–23 (discussing Marsh); Langvardt, supra note 130, at 1366–67
(same).
164 See Klonick, supra note 16, at 1659 (noting the challenges of categorizing social media platforms as
state actors).
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promoting the weakening of the dichotomic approach.165 The growth of
powerful for-profit corporations in the 1950s and onwards has generated the
legal discourse that questions whether some public law constrains should be
imposed on corporate behavior.166 The process of privatization, in which
public services are transferred into private entities’ hands, has further
amplified this discourse, since it further blurred the dividing line between
public and private spheres.167 Privatization, in fact, was supposed to be
perceived as “publicization,” since public law norms such as accountability,
due process, equality, and rationality might extend to private actors through
budgeting, regulation, and contracts.168 As explained above, the U.S. state
action doctrine could easily be triggered in clear-cut cases of state involvement,
thereby introducing the entire set of public law standards into private sphere
activity.169 The hard cases, where private activity has great public impact but
no direct state “footprints,” are the controversial ones. These hard cases
165 See Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423
(1982) (chronicling the history of the public/private distinction); Aharon Barak, Constitutional
Human Rights and Private Law, 3 REV. CONST. STUD. 218, 220, 225, 228 (1996) (describing Israeli
law and other models for imposing public law obligations upon private parties); Sabino Cassese, New
Paths for Administrative Law: A Manifesto, 10 INT’L J. CONST. L. 603, 607 (2012) (commenting on
the public versus private conceptions in administrative law).
166 For example, already in 1957 Friedmann published his scholarly piece, questioning whether public
law obligations should not be imposed on powerful corporations. See Wolfgang G. Friedmann,
Corporate Power, Government by Private Groups, and the Law, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 155, 165 (1957)
(“[T]he question must be raised in all seriousness whether the ‘overmighty subjects’ of our time—the
giant corporations, both of a commercial and non-commercial character, . . . have taken over the
substance of sovereignty.”); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 133, at 510–511 (“[T]he concentration
of wealth and power in private hands, for example, in large corporations, makes the effect of private
actions in certain cases virtually indistinguishable from the impact of governmental conduct.”). This
discourse should not be mixed with more radical views, from a political science perspective,
perceiving any corporate being an artificial entity created by law, as an entity that should be subject
to some public law norms. See, e.g., David Ciepley, Beyond Public and Private: Toward a Political
Theory of the Corporation, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 139, 156 (2013) (stating corporations are
“neither wholly private nor wholly public,” but exhibit properties of both).
167 Daphne Barak-Erez, A State Action Doctrine for an Age of Privatization, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1169
(1995); Cheryl L. Wade, For-Profit Corporations That Perform Public Functions: Politics, Profit,
and Poverty, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 323 (1999); Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions and
the New Administrative Law, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 813 (2000); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as
Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367 (2003); Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public
Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029 (2005).
168 See Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285,
1285 (2003) (suggesting privatization “can be a means of publicization”); see also Jack M. Beermann,
Administrative-Law-Like Obligations on Private [Ized] Entities, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1717, 1731–34
(2002) (discussing antidiscrimination law in the private sector).
169 Barak-Erez, supra note 160, at 1172.
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concern, for instance, a public function utility, i.e. an activity that is public in
nature (such as the one discussed in Marsh v. Alabama),170 or a private activity
with an indirect state nexus, i.e. a “close” cooperation between the private
entity and a state agent.171 Privatization, for instance, might fall into any of these
two options.172
From a broader perspective, public law, including its two sub-branches of
administrative and constitutional law, is facing a gradual and consistent process
in which it is percolating into private law. Vast scholarly writing covers this
phenomenon. Jody Freeman’s work, as well as that of other scholars, for
instance, has unveiled both myths and the reality around the public/private
dichotomy.173 After inspecting these two legal fields, following the Critical
Legal Studies tradition, Freeman has concluded that there is a complex
mechanism of constant “negotiation” between private and public actors, which
ends up with intertwined legal outcomes. The challenge of the traditional
public/private divide is addressed from various perspectives, including the way
public norms are crafted and enforced.174 She further argues that “There is no
purely private realm and no purely public one" therefore scholarly attention
should be focused on the . . .—"set of negotiated relationships between the
public and the private.”175 Moreover, a non-dichotomic perception of the
public/private realm led to the understanding that the application of public law
standards may be a matter of degree, according to the relational public nature
of the activity, the strength of cooperation with state actor, and according to
contractual obligations.176
The European legal legacy and international law trends are more willing to
accept the introduction of public law norms into the private sphere. Such

170
171
172
173

See supra notes 142–140 and accompanying text.
See Barak-Erez, supra note 160, at 1178 (explaining the nexus theory of state activity).
This is the stance offered by an extensive scholarly movement. See id.
See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in the Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 548 (2000)
(proposing a more realistic conception of the public/private distinction); Freeman, supra note 167.
For similar conclusions, see Vandenbergh, supra note 167, at 2037–41 (discussing the important role

of private actors in government functions).
174 See Freeman, supra note 173, at 636 (discussing the role of government associated with regulation).
In that respect, the “nondelegation” doctrine is challenged as well. Id. at 580–586 (analyzing the
nondelegation doctrine). For further criticism concerning the myth and reality with respect to the
“nondelegation” doctrine, see Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
1367 (2003).
175 Freeman, supra note173, at 548.
176 See id. at 580 (commenting on this “essential dichotomy” between public and private).
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acceptance is addressed by scholarly writings and could be seen in judicial
decisions as well. In the pre-digital era, during the 1980s and 1990s and along
with the development of European Union Law, a growing body of scholarly
writings was devoted to theoretical analysis concerning the application of
human rights. For instance, Andrew Clapham opened his 1993 book with the
overall stance that:
[It] challenges the presumption that the fundamental rights and
freedoms contained in the European Convention on Human Rights
are irrelevant for cases which concern the sphere of relations between
individuals. . . . It is the application of human rights law to the action
of private bodies which I label “human rights in the private sphere” or
“the privatization of human rights.”177
Following this path, in 2011 the U.N. published its Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights, calling for the compliance of all private entities
with human rights.178 German law, in particular, is a prominent example of the
application of human rights standards in the private sphere, since every
provision of private law must be compatible with the system of values of
German Basic Law (i.e. Constitutional Law), and every such provision must
be interpreted in its spirit.179 In the seminal case of Lüth, discussing freedom
of expression, the German Federal Constitutional Court held that basic rights
are primarily to protect the citizen against the state, but as enacted in the
German Constitution, they also incorporate an objective scale of values which
applies, as a matter of constitutional law, throughout the entire legal system.180
In this case, a film producer filed a lawsuit against Erich Lüth, who called to
boycott his film due to the former’s anti-Semitic background. The Court held
that the introduction of human right standards into the relation of two
individuals is a matter of degree, namely it is an indirect application in contrast
to full and direct application as the case is with a state actor, yet in the specific
177 ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE 1 (1993).
178 See U.N. Human Rights, Office of the High Comm’r, Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights (Apr. 2011), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusi
nessHR_EN.pdf.
179 See DONALD P. KOMMERS & RUSSEL A. MILLER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 444 (3d ed. 2012) (“Every provision of private law must be
compatible with this system of values, and every such provision must be interpreted in its spirit.”).
180 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 15, 1958, 7 Entscheidungen
des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVERFGE] 198. See also Peter E. Quint, Free Speech and Private
Law in German Constitutional Theory, 48 Md. L. R. 247 (1989) (reviewing the Lüth case and its
impact on the full introduction of human rights into German private law).
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case freedom of speech prevails.181 This seminal case marked the opening of
the European balancing era, namely an era of judicial balancing of competing
constitutional rights, in private civil cases.182 The German Constitutional Court
has further developed the horizontal application of constitutional rights in the
private sphere in more recent cases. Moreover, this contemporary application
could arguably be perceived as direct. For instance, in a case discussing the
scope of freedom of expression in the premises of the Frankfurt Airport
(“Fraport”), held in 2011, the German Constitutional Court ruled that since
the State held seventy percent of the shares of the company that owned the
airport’s premises (with the remaining thirty percent held by a private entity),
the airport is bound to allow freedom of speech in the commercial parts of its
premises. The Court further stressed that as long as the privately owned
spaces are intended for public use, freedom of expression applies in these
public-use areas, which essentially constitute a “public forum.”183 Following
this case, further decisions developing the horizontal application of
constitutional rights were handed down;184 and in May 2019 the Court granted
an interim order against Facebook, obliging the restoration (“put back”) of a
far-right-wing political activist’s article that Facebook had blocked and
monitored as “hate speech,” on the basis of horizontal application of freedom
of expression as a constitutional right.185 The horizontal application of various
181 BVerfGE, supra note 180, at 204; Quint, supra note 180, at 260–261. For the indirect application
of constitutional rights in cases involving a private actor in German law, see Livia Fenger & Helena
Lindemann, The FRAPORT Case of the First Senate of the German Federal Constitutional Court
and Its Public Forum Doctrine: Case Note, 15 Ger. L.J. 1105 (2014) (discussing the German court
decision in the FRAPORT case).
182 See Jacco Bomhoff, Luth’s 50th Anniversary: Some Comparative Observations on the German
Foundations of Judicial Balancing, 9 GER. L.J. 121, 124 (2008).
183 BVerfG, Judgement of the First Senate of February 22, 2011—1 BVR699/06, English translation
available at https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2011/02/rs2
0110222_1bvr069906en.html.
184 See BVerfG, Judgement of the First Senate of July 18, 2015—1 BvQ 25/15, no English translation,
available at https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/2015/07/qk
20150718_1bvq002515.html; BVerfG, Order of the First Senate of April 11, 2018—1 BvR 3080/09
(ruling that “under specific circumstances, however, equality requirement relating to relationships
between private actors may derive from Article 3(1) of the Basic Law. Article 3(1) of the Basic Law
does
have
horizontal
effects,
inter
alia,
were
private
actors
exercise
their rights to enforce house rules under private law.”), English translation available at https://www.b
undesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2018/04/rs20180411_1bvr308009en.
html.
185 See BVerfG, Order of the Second Senate of May 22, 2019—1 BvQ 42/19, English abstract available
at https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2019/05/qk20190522
_1bvq004219en.html.
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human rights in the private sphere on the EU level is also an expanding
terrain.186
Another legal path, accepting the introduction of public law norms into the
private sphere, address the legal governing rules of various international
bodies, which were established to monitor or coordinate global behavior.187
Such bodies, being nongovernmental and usually not-for-profit organizations,
are in fact private entities who nevertheless subordinate themselves to
administrative law standards, at least to a certain extent. These international
organizations, therefore, have led to the gradual development of the notion of
Global Administrative Law, which adheres the application of basic public law
standards by non-state actors.188 Thereby, these bodies were categorized as
special, hybrid public/private bodies.189 The development of Global
Administrative Law has attracted much legal attention. Within this legal
discourse, the notion of accountability was developed as a standard that should
be applied on a global scale and outside the traditional and narrow stateindividuals scope.190 The notion of accountability in itself denotes a line of
basic administrative law standards, including transparency, reasoned decisions,
and independent review.191
The development of a special Global
Administrative Law for non-state global hybrid bodies raises the general issue
of hybrid bodies that will be further explored in Part III.D.

186 For a review of various EU cases applying human rights in the private sphere, see Eleni Frantziou,

The Horizontal Effect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU: Rediscovering the Reasons
for Horizontality, 21 EUR. L.J. 657 (2015).
187 Such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Anti-Doping Agency (ADA) or the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). For a taxonomy of these bodies, see
Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative
Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 20–23 (2005).
188 Id. at 22–23; see also Sebastian Lopez Escarcena, Contextualizing Global Administrative Law, 21
GONZ. J. INT’L L. 57 (2018); Christoph Mollers, Ten Years of Global Administrative Law, 13 INT’L
J. CONST. L. 469 (2015); Susan Marks, Naming Global Administrative Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L. L.
& POL’Y. 995 (2005); Richard B. Stewart, U.S. Administrative Law: A Model for Global
Administrative Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (2005).
189 See Kingsbury, supra note 187, at 16–17, 20.
190 See id. at 17. See also Danielle Hanna Rached, Doomed Aspiration of Pure Instrumentality: Global
Administrative Law and Accountability, 3 GLOBAL CONST. 338 (2014); David Dyzenhaus,
Accountability and the Concept of (Global) Administrative Law, 2009 ACTA JURIDICA, 3 (2009);
Simon Chesterman, Globalization Rules: Accountability, Power, and the Prospects for Global
Administrative Law, 14 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 39 (2008).
191 See Kingsbury, supra note 187, at 37–40 (discussing how global administrative law has provided
transparency, reasoned decisions, and right of review).
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D. The Doctrine of Hybrid Bodies
The discussion above stressed the profound gaps between the accepting
European approach to human rights standards in the private sphere in contrast
to the seemingly negative U.S. approach on the matter. However, legal reality
is a lot more complex. For example, while the German approach allows only
indirect application of human right standards in all potential civil law cases, the
American approach only scantly allowed such application as an interpretive
extension of the state-action doctrine—but when it did allow such an
interpretive move, the application of human rights standards in the private
sphere was direct.192 The different paths taken by the two legal systems has
generated different legal developments. One of such developments is the
notion of a hybrid public/private body, which since it encompasses a mix of
characteristics, it allows European countries to directly impose certain human
rights standards. Namely, concerning the general indirect imposition of
human rights in the private sphere, the doctrine further evolved to locate
specific “islands” in the private sphere in which some direct obligations could
nevertheless be imposed. Therefore, the doctrine of hybrid bodies may create
an appropriate bridge between the two legal approaches if the American stateaction doctrine would be interpretively stretched to cover at least robust cases
of hybrid bodies. In such case, both European and U.S. laws would allow a
concrete, direct application of public law norms in the private sphere and thus
create a coherent global norm for global hybrid bodies.
The doctrine of hybrid bodies is extensively discussed in the United
Kingdom. Article 6 to the Human Rights Act 1998 (the Human Rights Act)
stipulates that the obligations of public authorities apply to any person or body
performing “functions of a public nature.”193 Namely, the Human Rights Act
explicitly acknowledges the potential application of human rights standards on
private bodies, and the question is when such application is appropriate

192 Compare the German holding in the Lüth Case BVerfG, supra note 180 (applying human rights
indirectly), with the U.S. holding in the case of Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (using human
rights as a limitation of the law). See also Quint, supra note 180, at 273 (explaining how U.S. law
differs from German law in disputers between individuals).
193 See Human Rights Act 1998, c.42 § 6(1) (UK) (proclaiming that “it is unlawful for a public authority
to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right”); see also id. § 6(3) (proclaiming “In
this section ‘public authority’ includes— (a) a court or tribunal, and (b) any person certain of whose
functions are functions of a public nature.”)
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according to domestic court decisions.194 The hybrid bodies doctrine, i.e.
imposition of human rights standards on private bodies, was applied in cases
of privately run prisons or in similar cases of private psychiatric hospitals
exercising compulsory detention.195 The doctrine was also applied in the preHuman Rights Act era, in a seminal case held in 1987 concerning the Panel
on Takeovers and Mergers, a regulatory body operated on a municipal level
with enforcing powers. The Court held that since the powers exercised by the
Panel were essentially in the domain of public law, it should be subject to
judicial review.196 Since the Human Rights Act’s term “functions of a public
nature” is very vague, the application of the hybrid bodies doctrine is an
interpretive matter subject to policy considerations.197 Naturally, therefore, the
question of whether the hybrid bodies doctrine should be further extended to
other “grey areas” is controversial.198
An outstanding example of the controversy is demonstrated in the case of
Birmingham City Council (BCC) held by the House of Lords in 2007,
discussing whether a care home, providing accommodation and care to
residents pursuant to arrangements made with a local authority, is subject to
direct public law standards despite it being a privately owned and run
company.199 Lord Bingham adhered to a flexible measure, according to which
“there is no single test of universal application to determine whether a function
is of a public nature,”200 and there are many factors that should be considered

194 See Aston Cantlow v. Wallbank [2003] 3 All. ENG. REP. 1213, at ¶ 6 (HL) (“The broad purpose
sought to be achieved by [section] 6(1) is not in doubt. The purpose is that those bodies for whose
acts the state is answerable before the European Court of Human Rights shall in future be subject to
a domestic law obligation not to act incompatibly with convention rights. If they act in breach of this
legal obligation victims may henceforth obtain redress from the courts of this country. In future
victims should not need to travel to Strasbourg.”). See also YL v. Birmingham City Council (2007)
3 All ENG. REP. 957 (HL) at ¶¶ 4, 20, 55, 86–87 [hereinafter the BCC case].
195 See R v. Partnerships in Care Ltd [2002] 1 WLR 2610, 2619.
196 R v. Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Datafin plc [1987] QB 815.
197 See Aston Cantlow, 3 All. ENG. REP. at ¶ 12 (“What, then, is the touchstone to be used in deciding
whether a function is public for this purpose? Clearly there is no single test of universal application.
There cannot be, given the diverse nature of governmental functions and the variety of means by
which these functions are discharged today. Factors to be taken into account include the extent to
which in carrying out the relevant function the body is publicly funded, or is exercising statutory
powers, or is taking the place of central government or local authorities, or is providing a public
service.”).
The BCC case, supra note 191, at ¶ 128.
198 See H.W.R. WADE & C.F. FORSYTH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 538 (11th ed. 2014).
199 See the BCC case, supra note 191, at ¶ 1 (Bingham, L.J., dissenting).
200 Id. ¶ 5 (Bingham, L.J., dissenting).
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on a case-by-case basis, such as the nature of the service, the degree of state
involvement (whether by payment, regulation, or by any other means), and the
extent of the risk that the function at stake might violate an individual’s human
right.201 Baroness Hale joined, adding another important factor, which is the
public interest in having that task undertaken.202 Yet, the majority of the three
other Lords (Scott, Mance, and Neuberger) dismissed the appeal on the basis
of policy considerations. The majority’s opinion stressed that this case should
be distinguished from former decisions, since it did not meet a core delegation
of public authority, as the specific arrangement focused on residents that fell
outside the public scheme, and the care home served simply as a contractor
or a supplier of a public authority.203 Nevertheless, Lord Mance further
stressed that the refusal to apply the entire public law standard at stake does
not mean that no standards should apply at all. To the contrary: “Apart from
any contractual arrangements, the care home should view and treat all such
residents with equality.”204 In other words, the application of public law
standards is always a matter of degree.
In other states, such as Israel, the doctrine of hybrid bodies is highly
popular, and it can be applied in a wide range of cases. Under Israeli common
law, private entities that control public resources, supply a basic social need,
or fulfil a public function in nature, or whose function may promote social
values under necessity may altogether be imposed upon by Court to apply
certain administrative law standards, being acknowledged as hybrid bodies.205
This court-made rule raises the question of whether in other Anglo-American
legal systems, common law could serve as a legal basis for the adoption of the
hybrid bodies doctrine as well. At least one commentator raised such a
question with respect to U.S. common law, even if considering the current
formalistic approach of the U.S. Supreme Court as to the state action
doctrine.206 Moreover, it was suggested that the imposition of public law
201 See id. ¶ 5–11 (Bingham, L.J., dissenting).
202 See id. ¶ 67 (Hale, B., dissenting).
203 See id. at par. 115–17 (explaining that the specific service at stake was tailored for “self-funders”
residency, and therefore had a more commercial nature than public service); id. ¶ 141 (explaining
that contractors and suppliers of the government should not be regarded as hybrid bodies).
204 See id. ¶ 119.
205 See Barak, supra note 162, at 220–21.
206 See Henry H. Perritt, Towards a Hybrid Regulatory Scheme for the Internet, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 215, 268 (2001) (stating that “the regular courts did a good job of working out touchstones for
internet jurisdiction. They can do the same with respect to touchstones for accountable private
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standards on online rulers could be done in jurisdictions outside the U.S., or
by international organizations, which would inevitably generate an impact on
these entities’ conduct in the U.S. domestic arena as well.207
IV. ONLINE RULERS AS HYBRID BODIES

A. Application of the Hybrid Bodies Doctrine to Online Rulers
Considering the central role of online rulers in the current digital societal
structure and the rising importance of Digital Human Rights, the question is
whether time is ripe for imposing some public law standards on relevant online
actors. The scholarly voice adhering such legal move is growing stronger.208
Already during the dawn of the Internet, it was apparent that despite the wish
for it to be an entire free zone of conduct, some regulation would be inevitably
imposed.209 After almost two decades, scholars have proposed to perceive
online rulers as “public utilities,” namely essential services for public function210

207

208

209
210

regulation of the Internet”). See also Berman, supra note 107, at 1270, 1289–93 (challenging the illconsequences of the state action doctrine by adoption of constitutional principles in the civil society
as common and shared values, on a cultural level).
See Perritt, supra note 206, at 268. See also Laurence R. Helfer & Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Designing
Non-National Systems: The Case of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 43 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 141, 241 (2001) (stressing that international organizations could potentially insert
public law norms into the operation of national private entities: “Admittedly, ISPs are nominally
applying United States copyright law to these disputes, not non-national or international law.
However, the rules applicable to notice and take down disputes may well evolve away from purely
national roots toward contract enshrined norms and practices not tied to any particular prescriptive
authority”).
See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 128; Aswad, supra note 124; Bloch-Wehba, supra note 5; Keller, Who
Do You Sue?, supra note 6. See also Derek E. Bambauer, Cybersieves, 59 DUKE L.J. 377, 379, 393–
401 (2009) (proposing the global democratic procedural principles of accountability and transparency
for the operation of the “cyberspace,” without any pre value-based assumptions); JULIE E. COHEN,
CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 224
(2012) (proposing more operational transparency by online intermediaries); Ira Steven Nathenson,
Super-Intermediaries, Code, Human Rights, 8 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 19, 149–168
(2013) (proposing the application of “Digital Due Process” to online intermediaries, including three
major parameters: accuracy, transparency, and participation).
See Perritt, supra note 206, at 266.
See K. Sabeel Rahman, The New Utilities: Private Power, Social Infrastructure, and the Revival of
the Public Utility Concept, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621, 1668–70 (2018) (arguing that Internet
platforms take on the characteristics of infrastructure and ought to be regulated as public utilities);
see also supra note 131.
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or as entities which govern the backbone of democracy,211 which therefore
should be subject to some basic public law principles. The legal consequence
for imposing public law standards would be varied and may include obligations
for setting clear and transparent rules of operation, for securing equality
between all users, for giving reasoned decisions, and a right to file an appeal
with respect to such decisions to an objective quasi-judicial body. In other
words, these online rulers should serve as gatekeepers for digital human rights
who therefore would be subject to some administrative law standards, akin to
the Global Administrative Law trend.
The next question is what the legal mechanism for promoting such legal
move should be, and whether the doctrine of hybrid bodies is apt for such a
task. With respect to mass media, already in 1997, in the pre-Human Rights
Act era, the British Court left open the issue of whether a private radio station
should be subject to judicial review, while stressing the important public
function of radio services.212 One could expect that twenty years later, in light
of the emergence of the digital environment described above, and considering
the important role of Digital Human Rights and freedom of speech, some of
the major online rulers would be perceived as serving at least some public
function and therefore should apply at least some public law standards.
However, in the British case of Richardson v. Facebook, held in 2015, the
High Court of Justice refused to hold Facebook and Google as hybrid bodies
under British domestic law.213 In rejecting such legal interpretation, the Court
referred to the BCC holding, and specifically to Baroness Hale’s reasoning,
according to which in order for a private body to be regarded hybrid under
the Human Rights Act, it needs to carry out a function on behalf of the public
and be initially assumed responsible by the state, for example by the state’s
willingness to pay for such activity.214

211 See Eyal Benvenisti, Upholding Democracy Amid the Challenges of New Technology: What Role
for Global Governance?, 29 EUR. J. INT’L L. 9, 55–56, 71 (2018) (“The private social media
providers and other ICT companies shape the contemporary governance sphere due to their
possession of two major resources: their control of our channels of communication and, from this,
their ability to accumulate vast amounts of data that is necessary for commercial and governance
purposes.”).
212 See R. v. British Broadcasting Corp., ex parte Referendum Party. [1997] EMLR 605 (discussing the
criteria for time allocation of parties’ political campaign before elections).
213 See Richardson v. Facebook & Richardson v. Google, [2015] EWHC 3154, at par. 63 (QB) (holding
that “Facebook does not act ‘in the public interest’ in the relevant sense, nor can it conceivably be
described as performing ‘functions of a public nature’”).
214 See id.
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The British Court in the Richardson v. Facebook case preferred a very
narrow interpretation to the hybrid bodies doctrine, even if it leaned on the
BCC holding. The very short reasoning in this case is not self-explanatory,
and it does not present any underlying policy considerations. What
parameters would determine which function is conducted on behalf of the
public? Is the test asking whether the state would initially be willing to pay for
such a service is a relevant one today? The court ignored the centrality of
Internet intermediaries in the current societal structure, and it did not take
into consideration the function of online platforms as the public digital market
square. Moreover, this decision ignores the current reality, in which the
private sector initiates cutting-edge functions, based on mass public use, that
no state could initially pay for. As the public sphere is evolving, the term
“public function” should be a dynamic one as well.
There are several advantages in using the hybrid bodies doctrine for
imposing obligations on major online rulers. First, the mere acknowledgment
of an entity as a hybrid body is only the opening declarative step that should
be followed by an in-depth analysis of the concrete public law standards
applicable at stake, which should be made on a case-by-case basis. Truly, once
a set of standards is tailored in a certain case, it would reasonably apply to
future similar cases. However, in contrast to pure state obligations, the
application of public law standards on hybrid bodies could be partial or
gradual in terms of time and place.215 As hybrid bodies are located in between
the private and public spheres, the correlative obligations are a matter of
degree that should be designed in accordance to the “weight” of the core
nature of the service at stake as a “public function.” In that sense, the hybrid
bodies doctrine is a dynamic one.216 The inherent flexibilities of the hybrid
bodies doctrine are of great importance to the case of online rulers, since they
involve a complex set of competing interests, including various clashing Digital
Human Rights: those of the platforms versus those of the users.217 The
dynamic and gradual model allows all stakeholders a deliberative adaption of

215 See Perritt, supra note 206, at 266 (observing, already in 2001, that some policy with respect to the
Internet governance should be developed, stating that “they need some rough, practical benchmarks
to decide where private regulation should stop and public regulation begin. They need to be able to
define the boundaries, at least rough boundaries, between the public and private spheres.”).
216 See the BCC case, supra note 194.
217 See Van Loo, supra note 2, at 1327 (arguing that regulators must take an interdisciplinary approach
in order to create integrated rules).
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their acts and behavior, and in that regard, to a degree it emulates soft
regulation mechanisms, such as codes of conduct.218
Second, a major advantage of the hybrid bodies doctrine in the context of
online rulers is its global reach. The doctrine implies the use of basic
administrative law standards, which are common in all democracies.
Moreover, as explained above, in the past few decades, Global Administrative
Law has been a developing legal branch of public law, where supra-state
authorities operate in accordance with certain shared core administrative
standards of accountability.219 It would be perfectly in line to further stretch its
reach to global, multinational, online corporations.220 Internet governance
could not be left up to domestic rules for long,221 and there are growing signs
of cross-border regulation (except for the EU level).222
Finally, the adoption of the hybrid bodies doctrine could be done via
various legal paths that would fit diverse legal traditions. It may be adopted by
a Court ruling, following the British tradition that allows direct application of
the doctrine via the Human Rights Act.223 It may follow the German tradition,
which allows indirect application of human rights standards in all areas of law.224
It may also be adopted by a concrete piece of legislation, as it was done in
several European countries, such as the new German legislation imposing
certain obligations on a major social network, such as transparent decisionmaking concerning the removal of hate speech.225 Although this legislation is
218 See Perritt, supra note 206, at 301–05 (discussing a wide range of duties and standards that could be
imposed on online private entities, such as: accountability, independent self-regulatory bodies,
inclusion of public representatives in such bodies, application of the measure of proportionality,
rationality, fair process); see also supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text.
219 See supra notes 181–81 and accompanying text.
220 See Benvenisti, supra note 211, at 71, 79–81 (arguing, in the context of access to big data, which is
generated by major online corporations, that the imposition of some global administrative principles
over these private entities is justified).
221 See MacKinnon et al., supra note 48, at 22–25.
222 See Andrew Keane Woods, Litigating Data Sovereignty, 128 YALE L.J. 328 (2018) (exploring case
law challenging national sovereignty against large internet firms) ; see also Google Inc. v. Equustek
Solutions Inc. [2017] 1 S.C.R, 824 (granting a (controversial) “global injunction”).
223 See supra notes 186–87 and accompanying text (describing how the notion of a hybrid public/private
body allows the United Kingdom to directly impose certain human rights standards).
224 See supra notes 172–71 and accompanying text (discussing German law’s application of human rights
standards in the private and public spheres).
225 Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz [NetzDG] [Network Enforcement Act], Sept. 1, 2017,
Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz [BMJV] at 3352 (Ger.); see Thomas
Wischmeyer, ‘What is Illegal Offline is Also Illegal Online’—The German Network Enforcement
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aimed at pushing online platforms to remove content, and some fear the illconsequences of such removal on legal content and free speech,226 it
nevertheless serves as an example for the upfront introduction of public law
obligations on private bodies, keeping in mind democratic values.227 Yet, if a
legislative measure is taken, it should reflect a balanced mechanism, protecting
free speech as its underlying rational.228 The question remains as to the
doctrine’s adaptability to U.S. law. Despite the rigid trend of the U.S.
Supreme Court concerning the scope of state action doctrine, there is still
room for the adoption of the hybrid bodies doctrine by U.S. courts, as both
doctrines are basically interpretive legal tools. As it was suggested, the U.S.
Supreme Court needs only to be convinced that the relevant question is how
a “space” is used and not just who owns it when deciding if it is “public.”229
Moreover, once the Court ruled that a private stakeholder at stake is
nevertheless a “state actor” for that purpose, then it would take only one step
further, in line with the state action doctrine, to conclude that in such a case a
dynamic set of public law standards may apply.230 Although dissenting, in the

Act 2017, in FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS PROTECTION ONLINE: THE FUTURE REGULATION

226

227

228

229

230

OF

INTERMEDIARIES 28–56 (Bilyana Petkova & Tuomas Ojanen eds., Elgar 2019) (providing a review
and analysis of this new enactment and its social and political background).
See Mathias Hong, The German Network Enforcement Act and The Presumption In Favour of
Freedom of Speech, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Jan. 22, 2018), https://verfassungsblog.de/the-germannetwork-enforcement-act-and-the-presumption-in-favour-of-freedom-of-speech/ (arguing that “the
regulatory model of the NetzDG . . . amounts to a call for massive ‘overblocking’”).
See Heidi Tworek, How Germany is Tackling Hate Speech, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (May 16, 2017),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/germany/2017-05-16/how-germany-tackling-hate-speech
(describing Germany’s long-held belief in limiting free speech to protect democracy). See also
Wischmeyer, supra note 225, at 7 (claiming that “the NEA compels companies to consider in their
assessment of what can be posted online also [German] fundamental rights. In this sense, the NEA
can also be understood as part of the business and human rights movement”).
See Hong, supra note 226 (claiming that: “[W]hen balancing freedoms of expression against other
protected interests, there is a fundamental presumption in favour of freedom of speech. This
presumption applies at least to speech on matters which substantially affect the public . . . . The
presumption in favour of freedom of speech also [indirectly] binds private Internet companies such
as Facebook, Google, and Twitter. Since Lüth it was [also] applied to the general so-called indirect
third-party effect of freedom of expression in private relations.”).
See Developments in the Law: State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, 123 HARV. L. REV.
1248, 1310 (2010); Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering:
Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295, 1306 (1998) (arguing that
cyberspace changes the traditional notions of location in the context of sovereignty and regimes of
law).
See Mor, supra note 127 (expressing a similar view on “applying public law norms” to social network
sites); Nathenson, supra note 205, at 149–56 (proposing the application of “Digital Due Process” on
online intermediaries).
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very recent case of Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck, four
Justices thought that a private cable TV operator is subject to freedom of
speech obligations due to the fact that it operated under a state contract that
supplied the physical infrastructure and nothing more.231 It remains to be seen
how the American courts would rule in the case of a mega-online ruler’s
conflict with a robust user’s Digital Human Right.

B. The Infringing Content Monitoring Case Study
Allegedly copyright infringing content monitoring could serve as a case
study. As described above, content monitoring creates a major hurdle to the
accomplishment of Digital Human Rights, whether it is done by the American
mechanism of notice-and-takedown or the European style of blocking
orders.232 Legal content and speech thus may be foreclosed. Can online rulers
be indifferent to such results? Can they simply remove or block content upon
an ex-parte request? Should there be any procedural safeguards for the nonrepresented users? Should there be any procedural safeguards for balancing
Digital Human Rights?
Let’s inspect more closely the path of blocking orders, which is seemingly
applicable in the U.S. as well.233 In these cases, a major copyright stakeholder
usually reaches out to an ISP or a platform, requesting to block a website that
contains allegedly infringing materials. The ISP/platform is an uninvolved
third party, caught between the applicant and the alleged infringer. As a private
corporation, it wishes to diminish any legal risk and expenses, therefore the
immediate default would be to block. Even if the ISP/platform enjoys
immunity under a domestic scheme, it may still prefer to block the website,
since the immunity’s scope is national. The ISP/platform’s indifference on
the matter is deeply rooted in its basic motivation. Therefore, even if domestic
law requires a mandatory judicial blocking order and prohibits voluntary
blocking, the ISP/platform nevertheless would not voluntarily oppose such a
request and would not voluntarily invest resources to challenge an order that
is granted on an ex-parte basis.234 The problem is clear: The public’s voice is
not heard in these cases, and therefore the final decision may be one-sided.

231
232
233
234

Supra text accompanying note 148.
Supra part II.B.
See supra notes 77–71 (noting that blocking orders may be granted on a global scale).
See SECONDARY LIABILITY OF INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS (Graeme B. Dinwoodie ed., 2017)
(offering a comparative survey of “secondary liability” imposed on online intermediaries).
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The ISP/platform would act as an uninvolved private actor, even though it
serves a public function in nature. The same pattern occurs with respect to
the notice-and-take down schemes, in which the online intermediary’s prime
interest is to escape the conflict with minimum expenses and the least amount
of harm.235 The outcome is lack of representation of the public interest and
potential harm to users’ Digital Human Rights.
By contrast, if the ISP/platform were to be acknowledged as a hybrid body,
then there is room for discussing its obligations, stemming from its
accountability to guarantee the public’s Digital Human Rights. For instance,
the ISP/platform may be expected to reveal all relevant information it holds
relating to the blocking request at stake; it may be obliged to actively seek for
the alleged infringer response; it may be obliged to apply for judicial review on
the matter; and if the request is discussed in court, it may be obliged to actively
express its reasoned opinion why it is justified or not justified to block the
content in the specific case. In other words, the mere status of a hybrid body
does not automatically entail the imposition of all state obligations, but rather
stresses that the ISP/platform cannot behave indifferently to the case. The
ISP/platform should perceive itself, to a certain extent, as a facilitator of the
public interest, which he commercially serves. In other words, the
ISP/platform is expected to perform certain gatekeeper duties.236
The Copyright Single Market Directive, described above, 237 provided a
significant move for imposing obligations on online rulers, yet it was criticized
for imposing such obligations mainly in favor of copyright holders.
Considering this result, the importance of applying the hybrid bodies doctrine
on the very same entities becomes even more crucial and urgent, since it may
provide the judiciary with adequate means to implement the complimentary
obligations in favor of users and the public at large. Once the legislature has
adopted an active obligation of online rulers to monitor content, there is no
reason or justification not to allow the parallel mandatory mechanism for
promoting a balanced digital speech environment. Whereas the first step was
conducted by the legislature, the door was open to the adoption of the flip side

235 See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text (describing online intermediaries’ incentives under §
512 of the Copyright Act).
236 An analogy could be drawn from corporate law. See, e.g, Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77
S. CAL. L. REV. 53 (2003) (observing that the notion that a company and its executives serve as public
interest gatekeepers is widely accepted in corporate law).
237 See supra notes 84–78, 94–93 and accompanying text.
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of the coin through judicial discretion. For example, Article 17 to the
Copyright Single Market Directive requires online service providers to provide
rightsholders, at their request, with adequate information concerning the
“functioning of their practices” with regard to the cooperation between the
parties.238 Being a hybrid body, which thereby is obliged to standards of
transparency and equality, this information should be provided to any
stakeholder, such as users. In other words, this information should be open
to the public.239 Moreover, it could also be argued that users are entitled to the
very same complementary information concerning the functioning of the
online service providers' practices” taken for ensuring that legal content is not
removed. This is particularly true in light of Article 17 explicit clarification
that “The cooperation between online content-sharing service providers and
rightholders shall not result in the prevention of the availability of works or
other subject matter uploaded by users, which do not infringe copyright,” and
especially if the use of the work is permitted by national exceptions and
limitations.240 The measures employed should therefore be applied to serve
both conflicting sides, since a hybrid body could not favor or discriminate any
party.241 In other words, though the Copyright Single Market Directive
presents an asymmetric balance, the judicial doctrine may provide the
adequate counterweight, which may lead to a final, symmetric constitutional
application of obligations.242 Article 17 (9) further establishes a mechanism
akin to the American notice-and-takedown scheme, and emphasizes that outof-court redress mechanisms for settling disputes “impartially” should be
available for users.243 Being a hybrid body, the online service provider would
238 See supra note 90.
239 It should be noted that Article 17 (10) states that the Commission will organize stakeholder dialogues
to discuss best practices for cooperation between the parties, and that "For the purpose of the
stakeholder dialogues, users' organisations shall have access to adequate information from online
service providers on the functioning of their practices with regard to paragraph 4." In other words,
while the Copyright Single Market Directive acknowledges the users' legitimate interest to have access
to this information, it nevertheless does not acknowledge a fully-fledged entitlement of access to such
information.
240 See Copyright Digital Single Market Directive, supra note 76, at 120 (Article 17 (7)).
241 For a similar view, see Romero-Moreno, supra note 98, at 201 (arguing that the then proposed Article
13—currently Article 17—is inconsistent with the fundamental principle of “equality of arms,” namely
that “each party must be afforded a fair opportunity to argue their case under conditions which do
not put them at a substantial disadvantage vis-a-vis their opponent,” since it fails to provide equal
procedural safeguards to users).
242 For a similar view concerning the German Internet Enforcement Act (2017), see Hong, supra note
226.
243 See supra note 86; Copyright Digital Single Market Directive, supra note 82, at 121.
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be obliged therefore not only to set up such mechanisms but to ensure that
they are operated independently and to fully reveal the procedural work of the
mechanisms' operating bodies to verify their impartiality. Otherwise, the
requirement for an impartial out-of-courts dispute resolution mechanism will
not be guaranteed. Moreover, these independent, though in-house, bodies
should be obliged as hybrid bodies to give reasons for their decisions, and
such decisions should be exposed to external judicial review.244
The common arguments against the introduction of administrative law
standards into the operation of online rulers are that (a) it would prevent fast
content monitoring operated by automated machines (algorithmic
monitoring); (b) it stresses a default of non-removal, which then favors users
over rightsholders; and (c) it would place a heavy burden on the judiciary due
to the large amount of everyday conflicts.245 There are several answers to these
arguments. Concerning the automated mode of operation, the argument is
cyclic, since the question is indeed what the working assumptions of the
algorithm would be. Even in the case of various kinds of artificial intelligence
systems, the initial dataset is still designed according to human policy
considerations.246 Therefore, administrative standards do not contradict the
use of systems supported by artificial intelligence. There are some examples
of cutting-edge artificial intelligence systems that are used in support of judicial
decision-making processes;247 therefore a deliberative, transparent artificial
intelligence system could be designed for the initial process of content
monitoring as well. Concerning the question of what the default principle
should be in cases of disagreement—removal or non-removal of content—the

244 For a similar view, see Bloch-Wehba, supra note 5, at 80; Langvardt, supra note 104, at 394; Kadri
& Klonick, supra note 138. It should be noted that according to Article 17 (9), the dispute resolution
mechanism should be “without prejudice to the rights of users to have recourse to efficient judicial
remedies.” See Copyright Digital Single Market Directive, supra note 81, at 121. Therefore, the
Copyright Digital Single Market Directive only implicitly acknowledge, if at all, that online service
providers are obliged to hand reasoned decisions.
245 See Bloch-Wehba, supra note 5, at 78–79.
246 See Elkin-Koren & Perel, supra note 67, 8 (describing the uses of AI in the legal system).
247 For example, the COMPAS system assess potential recidivism risk. Its use for supporting sentencing
decisions was approved by court in some states. See, e.g., Criminal Law –– Sentencing Guidelines –

– Wisconsin Supreme Court Requires Warning Before Use of Algorithmic Risk Assessments in
Sentencing. –– State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016), 130 HARV. L. REV. 1530, 1530–32
(2017) (describing a case involving this issue). See also, Michael Veale, Algorithms in the Criminal
Justice
System,
THE
LAW
SOC’Y
OF
ENG.
AND
WALES
(2019),
https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/support-services/research-trends/algorithm-use-in-the-criminal-justicesystem-report/ (summarizing the potential and pitfalls of AI algorithms in criminal justice)
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answer is that the algorithm could be designed with a “tree” of possibilities
assessing the strength of the copyright infringement allegation, and the needed
weight for an automatic decision of interim removal.248 The algorithm could
also be designed in a way that transfers hard cases to human decision-making
for the interim period until they are assessed by the independent in-house
body for disputes.249 And most importantly, both the algorithm’s design and
the manual policy for interim decisions should be transparent.250 Finally,
concerning the fear of over-burdening the judiciary, if this is a consideration at
all for excluding a body merited for judicial review, then the answer is twofold.
First, such fears are often rebutted. Following the common law tradition, after
a line of reasoned decision is handed down, more clarity and certainty would
be created, thus fewer cases on the matter would be appealed on court.
Second, the judicial review may be conducted by a professional administrative
tribunal, which despite not cutting the public expenditure would nevertheless
save precious judicial time.251

C. Alternative Measures: Antitrust Laws
The fear that too much power in the digital realm is in the hands of few
private companies clearly leads to the question of whether the problem can

248 For a similar view, concerning recommendations for improving content ID systems in a way that
would reduce “false positive” outcomes, see Lester & Pachamanova, supra note 100, at 67–72.
249 In line with this stance, Article 17 (9) to the Copyright Digital Single Market Directive obliges
decisions to remove content following complaints to be “subject to human review.” See Copyright
Digital Single Market Directive, supra note 82, at 121. For the need to require a better oversight over
content ID systems’ performances, see Lester and Pachamanova, supra note 100, at 72.
250 For the view that algorithms in public use should be transparent, see Benvenisti, supra note 211, at
60–61. See also, Joshua A. Kroll, Joanna Huey, Solon Barocas, Edward W. Felten, Joel R.
Reidenberg, David G. Robinson, & Harlan Yu, Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633,
657–60 (2017) (claiming that transparency is often essential for accountability but that in many cases
transparency is not enough).
251 In Italy and Spain, the ordering of website blocking was entrusted to a specialized administrative
authority, which therefore is obliged to consider human rights’ implications. See Martin Husovec,
How Europe Wants to Redefine Global Online Copyright Enforcement, in PLURALISM OR
UNIVERSALISM IN INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW 513, 522 (2019) (elaborating on the Italian
model of regulation).
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and should be treated by antitrust laws.252 Under § 2 of the Sherman Act,253 as
interpreted by courts, a monopoly that was acquired through prohibited
conduct, such as exclusive dealing, price discrimination, product
tying and predatory pricing, has committed an offense which is subject to
judicial remedies.254 These remedies may include forcing large organizations
to be broken up, be run subject to positive obligations, and massive penalties
may be imposed.255 Therefore, the problem described above, of the
dominancy of the online rulers in the digital speech environment may be
potentially treated by the alternative path of antitrust remedies: either by
forcing the mega online rulers to break-up into smaller corporations or by
setting positive obligations, such as the ones discussed above, concerning
quasi-administrative virtues. The U.S. antitrust agencies, which are also
mandated to protect consumers, have already taken measures against major
online platforms in order to prevent conduct harmful to consumers, such as
misrepresenting security or privacy practices.256 Yet, the issue of content
monitoring and free speech concerns have not been regulated by these
agencies thus far.
While there exists a potential alternative antitrust path, it is less realistic to
tackle the specific problem of threat to freedom of speech. Antitrust law,

252 See Terrell McSweeny, FTC 2.0: Keeping Pace with Online Platforms, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1027, 1028–30 (2017) (proposing antitrust enforcement under the FTC Act as a tool for treating the
online platforms’ over market power). See also Jack Nicas, Karen Weise & Mike Isaac, How Each
Big Tech Company May Be Targeted by Regulators, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/08/technology/antitrust-amazon-apple-facebook-google.html
(outlining the scope of government investigations and potential action against large tech firms).
253 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018).
254 See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (citing Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457
U.S. 332, 343). See also Gregory J. Werden, Antitrust’s Rule of Reason: Only Competition Matters,
79 ANTITRUST L.J. 713, 726–37 (2014) (describing the “rule of reason” that was developed by the
Supreme Court, according to which only unreasonable restraints would be considered as violation of
the Antitrust laws).
255 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2018). For a description of the investigating and
enforcing authorities of the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), which is one out of the two U.S.
agencies enforcing antitrust laws, see FED. TRADE COMM’N, A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade
Commission’s Investigative, Law Enforcement, and Rulemaking Authority (Oct. 2019),
https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority. For an in-depth analysis of the
enforcing tools of both the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the FTC, see
Jonathan B. Baker, Jonathan Sallet, & Fiona Scott Morton, Unlocking Antitrust Enforcement, 127
YALE L. J. 1916 (2018).
256 See McSweeny, supra note 252, at 1035–37 (“[T]he FTC has brought more than 500 cases protecting
the privacy or security of consumer information.”).
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generally speaking, is aimed at preventing constrains on trade.257 Therefore,
antitrust laws are thus far focused on crafting prohibited commercial practices,
which results in the accumulation of a monopolistic market power that at the
end of the day may prevent free competition.258 Accordingly, the Big Five
technology companies were initially under investigation concerning concrete
commercial practices that traditionally fall under the auspices of antitrust law.259
For example, Facebook’s practice of mass acquisition of companies, including
major social platforms such as WhatsApp (the global messaging application
used by more than a billion people) and Instagram, could possibly be viewed
as a method of maintaining the company’s dominance over social media
networks, which violates antitrust laws. The prohibited act, then, would be the
consolidation of social media.260 Yet, the byproduct of such practice
concerning massive content monitoring and harm to the free digital speech is
not a direct trade issue, and it does not directly concern free competition in
the market. Antitrust laws would traditionally be concerned by the lack of
ability of potential competitors to enter the social media market and the
subsequent harm done to consumers in terms of price and quality of services.
It is doubtful whether antitrust laws, including consumer protection, could
challenge commercial practices that pose a problem to free speech without

257 The FTC explains the underlying rationale of antitrust laws as follows: “Yet for over 100 years, the
antitrust laws have had the same basic objective: to protect the process of competition for the benefit
of consumers, making sure there are strong incentives for businesses to operate efficiently, keep
prices down, and keep quality up.” FED. TRADE COMM’N, The Antitrust Laws,
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws.
258 The FTC perceives its mandate as follows: “The FTC will challenge anticompetitive mergers and
business practices that could harm consumers by resulting in higher prices, lower quality, fewer
choices, or reduced rates of innovation. We monitor business practices, review potential mergers,
and challenge them when appropriate to ensure that the market works according to consumer
preferences, not illegal practices.” FED. TRADE COMM’N, What We Do, https://www.ftc.gov/aboutftc/what-we-do.
259 See Jack Nicas et al., supra note 252 (discussing the investigations of antitrust issues in technology
companies). For a discussion concerning Google’s allegedly product tying practices and comparing
the E.U. and U.S. treatment of tying claims, see Travis Clark, Google v. Commissioner: A
Comparison of European Union and United States Antitrust Law, 47 SETON HALL L. REV. 1021
(2017). For a more general discussion concerning online platforms commercial conduct as a
consumer law problem, see Michael Katz & Jonathan Sallet, Multisided Platforms and Antitrust
Enforcement, 127 YALE L.J. 2142, 2143–45 (2018).
260 See Jack Nicas et al., supra note 252 (“In Washington, Brussels and beyond, regulators and
lawmakers are investigating whether the four technology companies have used their size and wealth
to quash competition and expand their dominance.”).
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any direct implications on trade constrains.261 In other words, although the
problem that this article is challenging stems from the dominance of online
rulers in their respective markets, it is nevertheless not a traditional antitrust
or a consumer protection question. The problem discussed in here is that
these online rulers govern the democratic discourse. Therefore, as proposed
above, since the problem is a public law question, it should be treated by
public law measures.
Moreover, on a pragmatic level, the legal measure regarding hybrid bodies
proposed to tackle the problem of content monitoring is easier and faster to
implement. All it takes is a judicial decision acknowledging an online ruler as
a hybrid body and setting the concrete obligation imposed. These measures
could be calibrated on a case-by-case basis, as the imposition of quasiadministrative obligations would be determined by a concrete and specific
judicial decision. In contrast, antitrust procedures may be very long and
complicated,262 could involve political players, and their final outcomes may be
“overshooting,” such as the breakup of corporations and criminal
procedures.263 Internet rulers’ activity should not be stopped but rather
regulated.
CONCLUSIONS
The digital information environment is operated by a pyramid of “inbetween” actors, known as online intermediaries. All these online actors are
involved in the flow of information, and thus they may function as “valves”
that control the traffic of content in their “pipelines.” Thus far, the control
over the flow of information is handled by these actors with almost no
regulation and according to their own policies driven by commercial
considerations. Therefore, these online intermediaries have become, in fact,
the online rulers. However, the issue of online content monitoring stands at
261 For a similar view, see McSweeny, supra note 252, at 1038–39 (stressing that the U.S. antitrust
agencies are “optimized to stop practices inflicting concrete harms on consumers and competition,
so the agency cannot address broader public interest concerns arising from the power of online
platforms in our digital economy”).
262 See id. at 1034 (“[A]ntitrust cannot keep pace with rapidly evolving technology markets . . . .
[A]ntitrust litigation can proceed slowly over the course of many years”).
263 For the view that the large size of media corporation has also many advantages, see Brenner, supra
note 22, at 1027 (stressing that “[l]arger companies possess abilities that can produce greater diversity
for society . . . . Second, large companies are often better positioned to combat government
censorship and support First Amendment freedoms”).
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the heart of contemporary social and legal discourse, since it challenges other
public, individual, or commercial entities’ constitutional rights and freedoms,
such as freedom of speech, or, more broadly, other “digital human rights.”
Online rules are facing a new legal and social challenge since they are
expected to strike the appropriate human rights balance despite being private
commercial entities. This phenomenon could be demonstrated through
several examples concerning content monitoring in cases of allegedly
copyright infringement, such as the legal schemes of “notice and takedown”
or “blocking orders.” The online rulers are expected to act as gatekeepers for
the sake of public interest—but with no legal and social infrastructure.
Against this background, the proposed research aims to explore whether
and how some of the basic public law standards, such as accountability,
transparency, equality, and reasoning, could be imposed on relevant private
entities that are currently engaged in online content monitoring. European
countries, in contrast to the U.S., are more willing to accept the introduction
of public law standards into the private law sphere. An accepted doctrine
acknowledges that in some cases, private entities, such as commercial
companies that serve a social function in nature, may be perceived as a hybrid
private/public body. The legal consequence stemming from such perception
is the that the door opens for the direct imposition of public law standards on
the relevant private entity. This article proposes that in relevant cases major
online rulers should be acknowledged as hybrid bodies in order to promote a
fair and balanced digital information environment. There are many
advantages to using this doctrine, which allows a gradual and dynamic
application of public law principles, and on a global scale. The challenge for
such a potential legal move in the U.S. is greater, considering the current
interpretation of the “state action doctrine,” which hinders the imposition of
constitutional rights and obligations on private entities. Nevertheless, this rigid
approach stems from a judicial doctrine that could be relaxed by further
judicial and legal elaborations. The significance of this proposed research,
therefore, lies in its potential to assist in shaping better policies and practices
for the future—policies that can and should be initiated by the U.S. judiciary.
In the past, the word “ruler” referred to the sovereign or the king or queen
of a realm. In modern democracies, the term reflects the perception that the
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people’s will rules. The digital environment has become the backbone of
democracies. Therefore, the time is ripe for online rulers to move from
perceptions of the past to democratic ones.
264

“Sovereign,”
OXFORD
LEXICO
UK
DICTIONARY,
264 See
https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/sovereign (defining the term as “[p]ossessing supreme or
ultimate power” and providing the example sentence that “in modern democracies the people’s will
is in theory sovereign”). See also Cass Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 256
(1992) (discussing the nexus between modern sovereignty and freedom of speech).

